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Abstract
What role do domestic audience costs play across different types of foreign policy threats 
issued? Research on domestic audience costs—the domestic penalty a leader would face for 
making foreign threats and then backing down--provides direct evidence for the existence 
of audience costs for leaders who back down from hard power foreign policy threats, such 
as the threat to use militarized force. This thesis tries to understand the role of domestic 
audience costs across different foreign policy tools. Following Tomz (2007), I designed 
questionnaires that depict four different scenarios of hard and soft power foreign policy
crises in the Turkish context.
My findings indicate that Turkish citizens hold a leader more accountable for following up 
on threats regarding foreign policy tools of economic sanctions and border blockades. The 
public is less willing to punish reneging from both a more hard power tool--militarized 
force, and a softer foreign policy tool--the extension of foreign aid. These findings suggest 
that the level of audience costs differs across different foreign policy tools. In addition, I 
found that Turkish national security, international reputation, and its relationship with 
neighbors are important factors to Turkish respondents when making a decision about how 
the prime minister handled the situation. On the other hand, establishing Turkey’s 
leadership in its region was found to be the least important factor. Finally, evidence 
suggests that the main source of audience costs for the Turkish public emanate from their
concern regarding national security and the international reputation of the country. 
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TÜRKİYE SERT VE YUMUŞAK GÜÇ DIŞ SİYASETİNDE İZLEYİCİ MALİYETİNİN 
ROLÜ
JUAN JAVIER TEC
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014
Tez Danışmanı: M. Emre Hatipoğlu
Anahtar Kelimeler: İzleyici maliyeti, sert güç, yumuşak güç, 
dış politika araçları, Türkiye Başbakanı, kriz senaryoları
Özet
Yerli izleyici maliyetinin farklı dış siyaset tehditleri üzerinde oynadığı rol nedir? Yerli 
izleyici maliyetleri – bir liderin dış tehdit yaratıp ardından vazgeçmesinin ülke içinde 
cezalandırılması – üzerine yapılan araştırma, silahlı kuvvet kullanma tehdidi gibi sert güce 
dayalı dış siyaset tehditlerinden vazgeçen liderler için izleyici maliyetlerinin söz konusu 
olduğuna dair doğrudan kanıt sağlar. Bu tez farklı dış siyaset araçları üzerindeki yerli 
izleyici maliyetlerinin rolünü anlamayı amaçlıyor. Tomz’u (2007) temel alarak Türkiye 
bağlamında sert ve yumuşak güç ile ilgili dış siyaset krizleri hakkında dört farklı senaryo 
betimleyen anketler tasarladım. 
Bulgularım Türk vatandaşlarının lideri daha çok ekonomik yaptırımlar ve sınır ablukaları 
ile ilgili dış siyaset araçlarına ilişkin tehditleri takip etmekten sorumlu tuttuğunu gösteriyor. 
Halk hem sert güç aracı – silahlı kuvvet gibi – hem de yumuşak güç olarak dış siyaset 
aracından – dış yardım uzantısı gibi – vazgeçmeyi cezalandırma konusunda daha isteksiz. 
Bu bulgular izleyici maliyetlerinin seviyesinin farklı dış siyaset araçları arasında farklılık 
gösterdiğini ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca Türk katılımcılarının başbakanın durumu nasıl idare 
ettiği konusunda karar vermelerinde Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliği, uluslararası itibarı ve 
komşularıyla ilişkilerinin önemli etkenler olduğu sonucuna vardım. Diğer yandan 
Türkiye’nin bölgedeki liderliğinin pekiştirilmesinin en önemsiz etken olduğu ortaya çıktı. 
Son olarak, bulgular Türkiye halkı için izleyici maliyetinin ana kaynağının, ulusal güvenlik 
ve ülkenin uluslararası itibarı hususundaki kaygılardan ortaya çıktığını gösteriyor.
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11.   INTRODUCTION
What role do domestic audience costs play across different types of foreign policy threats 
issued? Frequently, states are faced with foreign policy crises where their respective 
domestic political audiences observe and assess how their political leaders choose to handle 
such crises at hand. Understanding why and how international crises occur and unfold was 
the motivation behind James Fearon’s (1994) work on audience costs theory. Fearon argued 
that political leaders who choose to back down from an international crisis are faced with 
domestic audience costs which increase if leaders further escalate the crisis. Twenty years 
have passed since the introduction of audience costs theory. And since then, audience costs 
theory has opened new avenues of research which have later proved to be very important. 
For example, scholars have applied it to other settings of international relations such as 
alliances (Gaubatz 1996), international cooperation (Leeds 1999), and trade (Mansfield, 
Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). 
The immediate empirical tests, which followed the seminal work where Fearon coined 
the term, tried to establish the existence of audience costs through indirect tests, mainly 
focusing on whether international militarized threats escalated into the use of force or not 
(see, for example, Eyerman and Hart 1996; Partell and Palmer 1998; Schultz 2001). Recent 
research started pointing towards direct evidence that political leaders suffer domestic 
consequences after publicly issuing threats or promises and failing to follow through (see 
Tomz 2007, 2009). Analyses by Tomz (2007) were based on a series of experiments 
embedded in public opinion surveys. And these findings indeed show audience costs exist.
My research question mainly builds on Tomz’s (2007, 2009) recent studies on audience 
costs. The scenarios Tomz presented to the respondents solely focused on the use of 
2militarized threats. And as a result, Tomz tested for audience costs in a scenario of hard 
power foreign policy, eventually overlooking the role of audience costs in a soft power 
situation. Interestingly almost all studies look at militarized threats, and as such, threats by 
leaders that resort to force if their demands are not met. However, international diplomacy 
and international crisis resolution happens in far more cases where military is not even on 
the table. Despite the salience of alternative foreign policy tools, no study has been done to 
test (1) whether audience costs exist for foreign policy scenarios involving soft-power 
scenarios. And to test (2) what is the relative salience of audience costs across these 
different foreign policy tools.
In this thesis, I take a closer look at the role of domestic audience costs between 
Turkish hard and soft power foreign policies by replicating Tomz’s approach in the Turkish 
setting. For this study, a set of questionnaires were distributed to 100 Turkish citizens 
compiled through convenience sampling. Via their answers to hypothetical scenarios, I 
tried to measure whether the presence of audience costs significantly varies between hard 
and soft power foreign policy. Research on the role of audience costs between hard power 
and soft power foreign policy could benefit leaders who are vulnerable to audience costs in 
deciding whether to issue empty commitments or not in the case of a foreign policy crisis. 
The analysis shows that audience costs are present across all four scenarios of 
foreign policy. In particular, audience costs resulted in higher frequencies for a hard power 
foreign policy scenario involving economic sanctions, and for a soft power foreign policy 
scenario involving the blockade of national borders. In this sense, I found that the role of 
audience costs varies across different tools of foreign policy. And lastly, I found that the 
majority of Turkish respondents were driven to punish reneging leaders in all foreign policy 
scenarios because of concerns for the international reputation and national security of the 
Turkish Republic. Additionally, evidence also shows that, to some extent, respondents 
cared about Turkey’s moral responsibility to help neighboring countries and about Turkey’s 
foreign relationship with its neighbors. All in all, the reasoning for respondents choosing 
how to rate their leader was contingent upon the aforementioned rationales. Meanwhile, the 
rationale of Turkey’s role as a regional leader received very little concern from the vast 
majority of respondents.  
In the remainder of this article, I delve into the theoretical background of audience 
3costs. Then I further corroborate that constituents disapprove of leaders who make 
international threats and then renege. In addition, I look into some factors that might have 
some influence in the way respondents approve or disapprove of how the Turkish Prime 
Minister handled the situation at hand. I then further into the rationales used by constituents 
for judging their prime ministers’ actions. Finally, as a step toward deepening our 
theoretical as well as empirical understanding of audience costs, I investigate what 
rationales drive citizens to react negatively to empty threats.
42.  TURKEY AS A SETTING FOR AUDIENCE COSTS
In 1960, Schelling contended that political leaders can reinforce their bargaining position in 
a foreign crisis by making overt public statements to incite public opinion in order to avoid 
concession (Schelling 1960). Through this logic, scholars such as Fearon (1994) 
emphasized on the incentive leaders have in being held accountable by domestic political 
audiences. More specifically, that domestic political audiences would punish political 
leaders for backing down on a given foreign policy issue. However, as mentioned before,
this penalty for leaders was at first empirically tested by referring to militarized cases in 
which democratic leaders were actually punished by domestic political audiences (Schultz 
2001). Direct evidence of audience costs were also measured through militarized crisis 
scenarios (see, e.g., Tomz 2007, 2009). As a result, the existence of audience costs has 
solely been tested in cases of hard power foreign policy, rather than soft power or both.
In a realists world where states operate on an anarchic system, possess some offensive 
military capability, are uncertain of other states, and are rational actors seeking to maximize 
their likelihood of survival (see Mearsheimer 2007); coercive or coaxing foreign policy 
strategies would appear to be normal in state behavior. According to Joesph S. Nye’s 
(1990) instrumental logic of foreign policy actions, such types of foreign policy strategies
almost always require the use of force that are oriented towards adding up the benefits of a 
course of action and then comparing them with the associated costs. However, the use of 
force has become more costly for modern day state powers, while soft-power foreign policy 
strategies have become increasing attractive (see Nye 1990:168). Soft-power foreign policy 
strategies are oriented towards ensuring cooperation and that others would automatically 
follow the lead of the power-holder due to the power of attraction (Oğuzlu 2007). In this 
5regard, some scholars have acknowledged soft power as an essential resource of statecraft 
that builds attraction and employs an intangible power of persuasion rather than economic 
and military power (Cooper 2004; Wilson III 2008).
According to Oğuzlu (2007), domestic and international developments in Turkey during 
the beginning of the 21st century gave rise to its soft power capabilities in the region. On 
the other hand, Altinay (2008) contends that Turkey’s soft power potential is due to its 
capacity to attract and inspire regional neighboring states that share similar historical and 
cultural ties. In a similar matter, Kalın (2011:7) argues that Turkey’s soft power capacity is 
a product of Turkey’s “history, geography, cultural depth, economic strength, and 
democracy.” Regardless where Turkey’s soft power potential originates from, it has also 
been noted that it is limited due to endogenous and exogenous constraints (see, for 
example, Altunışık 2008). More recent literature has also argued that analyses of Turkey’s 
soft power foreign policy have been fraught with conceptual issues that, in turn, reduce the 
capacity to explain foreign policy outcomes (see Demiryol 2014). Nonetheless, much of 
Turkish soft power has been underlined in world politics through its foreign policy tools 
and strategies as a third party actor and cultural hub. In particular, Turkey has played both 
humanitarian and third party roles in the management and resolution of global conflicts in 
distant regions such as Somalia, the Balkans, and Lebanon (see, inter alia, Altunışık 2008; 
Öner 2013; Zenalaj, Beriker, and Hatipoglu 2012; Timocin 2013). In addition to this, 
Turkey’s role as a cultural hub has further underlined Turkish soft power in world politics. 
For instance, Turkey’s rising image around the globe is, in part, due to soft power tools 
coming in the likes of cultural exports (Deniz 2010), tourism (Altinay 2008), and even its 
national airline company, Turkish airlines (Selçuk 2012).
The institutional setting in a polity to examine audience costs requires two 
properties: (1) the country should have the willingness and capability to conduct a variety 
of foreign policy tools, and (2) the country’s leader should be culpable to domestic political 
actors, preferably most importantly through elections. Turkey is a suitable case for such 
examination. Turkey’s foreign policy has recently been employing a wide range of tools, 
which spawn a wide geography around the globe (see, inter alia, Oğuzlu 2007; Altunışık 
2008; Kalın 2011; “Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs” 2011). In Turkey, 
general elections are held on a regular basis; currently every four years. Furthermore, 
6elections are, for the most part, free and fair. Additionally, the national suffrage appeals to 
the international democratic norms. Above all, elections are known to be a very important 
part of the Turkish political culture because Turkish policy makers alike diplomats have 
always underline the importance of the Turkish public opinion (Erdoğan 2005). Also, with 
the presence of democratic elections in Turkey, an increase in the transparency of foreign 
policy issues along with an increase in media and press coverage, have given rise to public 
opinion on international relations of the nation state (see, Kalaycioğlu 2009). This advent of 
public opinion has been identified by Kalaycioğlu (2009) to heed, engage with, and even 
take into account foreign policy issues. As a result, the public opinion in Turkey can be 
seen as a source of impact on the way in which political party groups or factions vote in the 
National Assembly (Kalaycioğlu 2009). This falls in tandem with evidence that suggests a 
notable increase in foreign policy salience in Turkish politics (see Keyman 2009). All in 
all, recent research illustrates how Turkish foreign policy has occupied an important part in 
the electoral manifestos of major parties represented in the Turkish parliament (see
Hatipoglu, Aslan, and Luetgert, 2014).
73.  A REVIEW ON THE LOGIC OF AUDIENCE COSTS
3.1. Theoretical Background
Audience cost theory has generated a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research. 
The initial logic of the theory, defined by Fearon (1994), suggested that political leaders 
would be held accountable to domestic audience costs for openly issuing a threat during an 
interstate crisis, and then backing down. According to Fearon (1994), democratic leaders 
are, by implication, more likely to be subject to audience costs due to their vulnerability of 
suffering from unfavorable public elections. Moreover, Fearon (1994) asserted that 
democratic leaders were more likely to threaten when they intended to follow upon that 
threat if needed. More specifically, Fearon argued that domestically accountable leaders 
selectively threatened other countries because backing down would result in substantial 
domestic political costs. As a result, threatened states that are cognizant of this would more 
likely take threats from democracies more seriously (Fearon 1994; Smith 1998; Schultz 
2001). However, more recent research illustrates empirical evidence towards the presence 
of audience costs for particular types of non-democratic leaders as well (see, inter alia, 
Weeks 2008; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012). For instance, Weeks (2008) found that 
audience costs for some autocratic leaders emanate from domestic elites who act as 
audiences that are similar to domestic political audiences in democracies. In conjunction 
with this, under particular conditions, certain types of autocracies, like democracies, also 
seem to be capable of credibly signaling resolve with the presence of audience costs (Kinne 
and Marinov 2012).  
8Proving the existence of domestic audience costs has initially been through indirect 
measurements, mostly looking at whether threats emanating from democratic countries are 
perceived more credible by the targeted state. Fearon’s conjecture of audience costs being 
higher in democracies than in autocracies led; Eyerman and Hart (1996), Gelpi and 
Griesdorf (2001), and Partell and Palmer (1999) to check for correlations between 
democracies and foreign policy. More specifically, the aforementioned scholars developed
statistical models of interstate crisis behavior to see whether threats issued by democratic 
states are perceived to be more credible by the target. The findings from all three studies 
indeed showed that democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs and hence 
signaling resolve. However, while being good initial attempts towards providing empirical 
support for Fearon’s assertion on the relationship between democracy and the level of 
audience costs in a polity, these same empirical tests do not directly prove that audience 
costs exist in practice. In other words, these studies do not examine whether audience costs 
actually cause a democratic leader to suffer from a domestic penalty.1 The shortcomings of 
these earlier studies have recently been discussed in more detail by Gartzke and Lupu 
(2012).
Realizing some of the shortcomings of previous studies, scholars started studying 
the direct impacts of audience costs. Such direct impacts range from looking at the fate of 
leaders who issued such threats without following through, the intentions of leaders, the 
extent that leaders can communicate with each other, to how they perceive such 
information. Such empirical evidence can be retrieved from historical case studies where 
the situations being examined closely resemble the function that audience costs theory 
predicts. However, the concern that most scholars commonly take issue with is partial 
observability and strategic selection bias (Schultz 2001; Baum 2004; Tomz 2007). More 
specifically, these concerns that scholars take issue with come along with examining 
historical case studies in which domestic audience costs are found to have taken place.  
Nonetheless, such studies that employed historical case study analyses for 
examining audience costs theory should not be disregarded. If anything, they are fine 
                                               
1All of this very much resonates with evidence found to support the existence of gravity. It is obvious that 
gravity is not visible; however, it can be measured and hence confirmed to exist through its implications. In 
this respect, the same could be said for early research of audience costs theory.
9contributions to the theory upon that some have augmented the scope of the theory itself. 
For example, Schultz (1998) delves on Fearon’s (1994) assertion that leaders are left with a 
penalty to pay when failing to follow through with publicly announced foreign policies. To 
test the validity of this claim, Schultz (1998) uses historical events and large-N analysis to 
shed light on the role of political opposition mobilization with respect to inciting the 
domestic penalty that Fearon (1994) had conjectured in his theory. This contribution later 
proved to be useful to scholars like Prins (2003:68), who in addition to suggesting that 
political opposition was a key component of audience cost signaling, also suggested that 
“an uncertainty regarding the stability of a regime’s political competition naturally had an 
impact on foreign policy decision-making.”      
More recent research has paid close attention to the methodological difficulties (i.e., 
strategic selection bias and partial obervability) that surfaced in testing Fearon's argument 
about domestic political audience costs and signaling in international crises (see, e.g., 
Schultz 2001; Baum 2004; Croco 2011). For example, Schultz (2001) used a formal model, 
brief case studies, and Monte Carlo simulations to show that earlier studies biased direct 
tests against supporting either of the audience cost propositions. In doing so, Schultz 
(2001:36) adds to the audience costs conjecture by demonstrating that “estimates using 
observed audience costs underestimate both the level of audience costs in the population 
and the difference in means across regime types.” 
Baum (2004) avoids strategic selection bias by focusing on the case of the United 
States. Here, Baum (2004) finds empirical evidence indicating that U.S. presidents tend to 
avoid generating audience costs when no national security interests are at stake. Lastly, 
Croco (2011) also bypassed strategic selection bias by creating and using her own data set 
to test the role of domestic audience costs for culpable and non-culpable leaders. 
Ultimately, she finds that only culpable leaders who lose are vulnerable to domestic 
audience costs, while those who lose and are non-culpable leaders are exempt from such 
domestic audience costs.
Overall, Fearon’s predictions were initially widely tested through indirect 
implications. Such existing studies only employed the nature of domestic institutions (i.e., 
the regime type, the political status, etc) as a substitute for indicating to what extent a 
leader could domestically be accountable in its foreign policy threats and actions. In the 
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end, almost all audience costs models in the extant literature gave leeway to two important 
conjectures of audience costs theory: 1) that a state leader incurs audience costs to a certain 
extent, and this cost can jeopardize the leader’s political career when they openly issue a 
public threat or promise and fail to follow through, and 2) that their institutional setup put 
democracies at an advantage towards generating audience costs, which could then be used 
to credibly signal their intentions to other states.
The methodological challenges mentioned earlier in empirically and directly testing 
the existence of audience costs rendered an empirical conundrum for scholars of 
international relations. Tomz (2007) was the first scholar to come up with two separate 
research designs that directly tested for the existence of audience costs. Audience costs 
theory was directly tested through a survey design that was able to avoid both indirect 
findings and strategic selection bias. More specifically, Tomz’s experiments--which were 
embedded in public opinion surveys--illustrated that audience costs actually existed. In 
doing so, Tomz (2007) confirmed that citizens actually punish their leaders who say one 
thing but do another.
The literature has been focused towards advancing this theoretical frontier. And it is 
important to understand how this notion of audience costs underwent various transitions. 
To do this, I continue with a general overview of the theory by presenting major early 
works that quickly went on to assume a dichotomy between democracies and autocracies in 
respect to the ability to generate audience costs. Then, I survey some major themes that 
emerged over time with audience costs literature. Following a survey of major themes, I 
then delve into the dichotomy of democratic and autocratic regimes that developed in the 
early stages of the theory. Next, I continue to focus on the dichotomy of political regimes, 
in bringing into account how later studies of the theory caused problems for the idea in 
place, eventually shattering a common assumption of a dichotomy between democratic and 
autocratic regimes. Further on, I give heed to empirical advancements that led to a furthered 
understanding of whether audience costs actually existed or not, and if so, how they 
worked. All while taking into account how there have also been theoretical backlashes 
against this theoretical argument. And finally I discuss how a number of scholars have 
taken issue with the empirical support for the audience cost theory. All in all, this chapter 
provides an analytical descriptive literature review of audience costs theory.
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3.2. Earlier Works on Audience Costs Theory
Schelling’s statement; “the right to be sued is the power to accept commitment or make a 
promise” (Schelling 1956:299); paved the way for James D. Fearon’s 1994 study; Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. In a nutshell, Fearon 
argued that a leader, who openly issued a threat and then renege, could then be susceptible 
to being held accountable by domestic punishment that would put his political career in 
danger. Furthermore, due to the presence of such a domestic penalty, a state leader would 
have the power to credibly commit to a threat or make a promise since she would only 
engage in such behavior when she would be intent in following such threats and promises. 
He further argued that electoral concerns which leaders in democratic regimes faced made 
these leaders more wary of audience costs. This logic opened new channels for research in 
international relations. And although his work was based on the context of war, it greatly 
contributed to further research in sub-disciplines of political science other than international 
relations (e.g. Huth and Allee 2002; Tarar and Leventoglu 2012) as well as in other 
academic disciplines of the social sciences, such as economics (e.g. Jensen 2003) and 
psychology (e.g. Hoffman, Agnew, Lehmiller, an Duncan 2009).
From a bargaining perspective, the ability for a state to incur domestic audience 
costs successfully gives that state the chance to credibly signal its resolve (Fearon, 
1994:577). This implication has constituted a major departure point for initial studies 
venturing to test the validity of the audience cost argument. Put in Slantchev’s (2012:377)
summary:
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“If (1) backing down in a crisis makes an actor suffer costs in addition to those 
arising from conceding the stakes, (2) these costs increase as the crisis escalates, (3) 
these costs can become so large that war becomes preferable to a concession, (4) no 
other mechanism for coercing the opponent exists, and (5) attempting to coerce the 
opponent does not increase his costs of conceding, then escalation can commit an 
actor to fighting, and the resulting risk of war discourages bluffing, which makes 
escalation informative and gives it a coercive role.”
In sum, Fearon (1994) assumes that in a conflict where a state backs down, its 
leaders suffer audience costs that increase as the conflict increases in severity. In this way, 
Fearon notes that democracies should be, on average, better able to generate audience costs 
than non-democracies. This general assumption that democracies had a larger capacity than 
non-democracies to generate audience costs became a common assumption in subsequent 
audience costs literature. And as mentioned earlier, major early works that followed 
Fearon’s theoretical model were attempts to empirically test several hypotheses that 
emanated from Fearon’s model (see, inter alia, Eyerman and Hart 1996; Smith 1998; 
Schultz 1998; Partel and Palmer 1999; Schultz 2001; Dorussen and Mo 2001; Prins 2003). 
Although these studies were briefly introduced early in this chapter, it is essential to delve 
into the specifics of these studies in order to better grasp a closer understanding of audience 
costs in the extant literature.
Beginning with one of the first published studies, Eyerman and Hart (1996) focused 
on examining Fearon’s argument: “that democracies should be able to effectively 
communicate their resolve and therefore escalate in fewer stages and back down less often” 
(Eyerman and Hart 1996:602). The authors evaluate this argument by observing the 
behavior of democracies and non-democracies within crises listed on SHERFACS, a phase-
disaggregated conflict management data set. More precisely, the authors compare the crisis 
activity of both democratic and non-democratic states. In doing so, the authors expected 
non-democratic states, on average, to have higher crisis activity than democratic states. The 
authors anticipated this trend because Fearon conjectures democracies to have stronger 
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domestic audiences. Because of the higher audience costs they are subject to, democratic 
states are hypothesized to seek crisis activity only when they have high resolve, in other
words, democracies threaten less frequently, and when they do, their threats are more 
credible. In comparison, non-democracies are expected to rely on greater crisis activity to 
signal their resolve. Ultimately, the authors found that domestic characteristics of 
democracies allow democracies to communicate intentions more effectively than non-
democracies. As a result, their findings also supported existing explanations of the 
democratic peace.
In another early study, Smith (1998) provides micro-foundations for why 
constituents are motivated to punish leaders who fail to follow through with their 
commitments. In doing so, Smith was interested in explaining why audience costs work, 
and he did this by predicting how domestic conditions and political institutions affect the 
extent to which audience costs bind leaders and, hence, the extent to which threats 
influence crisis behavior. In sync with this, Smith designed a model of state crisis behavior 
and domestic politics, which ultimately lead to two sets of results. Smith’s model first 
shows how domestic conditions within a state affect foreign policy decisions by all states 
involved in a crisis. Moreover, Smith finds that this association between domestic politics 
and foreign policy enables leaders to issue credible threats that deter adversaries. In this 
way, Smith explains why voters want to remove leaders who renege on their threats. With 
this he generates a theory for the creation of audience costs, and concludes that audience 
costs make foreign policy statements meaningful.
As for Partell and Palmer (1999), formal models of political events and large-N 
empirical tests were essential in empirically testing a number of interesting hypotheses 
from Fearon’s model. More specifically, the following four hypotheses from Fearon’s 
model were empirically tested by the authors: 1) “that states that are better able to generate 
audience costs are less likely to back down in disputes than states less able to generate 
audience costs;” 2) “that high-audience-cost states will be significantly less likely to initiate 
limited probes in foreign policy;” 3) “that in disputes in which both sides decide to escalate, 
the observable balance of capabilities should be unrelated to which side backs down; (4 and 
“that leaders who face high audience costs will pursue more escalatory strategies of crisis 
management when they face low-audience-cost states than when they face other high-
14
audience-cost states” (Partell and Palmer 1999:391-392). The empirical measurements of 
these hypotheses were done using a data set of the Correlates of War Project’s Militarized 
Interstate Dispute, 1816-1992 (MID).
Eyerman and Hart (1996) provided the first test of Fearon’s model; however, 
several problems are revealed when juxtaposed with this similar analysis from Partell and 
Palmer (1999). For example, even though Fearon asserts that nondemocratic leaders can 
also face strong domestic audience costs, Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) test only focused on
characteristics of democracy as their indicators of audience costs. Second, Partell and 
Palmer (1999) state that because Fearon’s audience-costs hypothesis is monadic, it should 
apply to all high-audience-cost states, regardless of their opponents' domestic political 
structure. However, Eyerman and Hart test the hypothesis at a dyadic level by only looking 
at the crisis behavior of states inside democratic crises. And finally, Partell and Palmer 
point out that Eyerman and Hart only test one hypothesis from Fearon's model, whereas 
Partell and Palmer (1999:390) take credit for using “multiple measures of audience costs to 
test four of the central hypotheses that flow from Fearon's model at the monadic rather than 
dyadic level of analysis.” As a result, Partell and Palmer’s (1999) study can be considered 
to be thorough empirical tests when compared to that of Eyerman and Hart’s (1996).
Ultimately, Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) along with Partell and Palmer’s (1999) 
investigations of audience costs supported Fearon’s (1994) conjectures. However, their 
empirical results were from measures of models in which audience costs were dependent on 
democracies. In this way, such tests overlooked “whether the effects of democracy stem 
from audience costs or from other differences between political regimes” (Tomz 2007:822). 
Schultz (2001), on the other hand, delves into the challenges of directly testing Fearon’s
model. Towards that end, he employed a formal model, brief case studies, and Monte Carlo 
simulations to illustrate that severe difficulty can surface in conducting and interpreting 
direct tests of the audience costs theory. For example, one could test leaders directly;
however, a leader that anticipates domestic audience costs would simply just avoid any 
action that would expose him or her to such penalties. In the end, Schultz (2001:52) arrived 
at the conclusion that “in general, finding evidence for the existence of audience costs is 
easier than determining whether they are higher or lower for some kinds of states.”
In all these early contributions, a dichotomy was assumed between democracies and 
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autocracies in respect to the ability to generate audience costs as these scholars assumed 
that due to electoral concerns, democratic leaders would be more susceptible to audience 
costs. As a result, this initially confined the scope and application of audience costs theory
to democratic institutional features. However, later studies of audience costs theory looked
at variance within authoritarian regimes in terms of incurring audience costs (Weeks 2008; 
Kinne and Marinov 2012).
3.3. Major Themes in Audience Costs Theory
Over the last two decades, various themes have emerged in audience costs literature. For 
example, audience costs as a theoretical mechanism has been applied to and associated in 
such instances as; war (e.g., Fearon 1994), economic sanctions (e.g., Dorussen and Mo, 
2001), institutional instability (e.g., Prins 2003), partisanship and backing down (e.g., 
Levendusky and Horowitz 2012), terrorism (e.g., Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012), public 
opinion (e.g., Baum 2004), media (e.g., Slantchev 2006), autocratic audience in the context 
of war (e.g., Weeks 2008; Kinne and Marinov 2012), and peacemaking and rapprochement 
(e.g., Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011).  Other themes worth noting include;
international cooperation (e.g., Leeds 1999), alliances (e.g., Gaubatz 1996), trade (e.g., 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002), foreign direct investments (e.g., Jensen 2003), 
debt repayment (e.g., Schultz and Weingast 2003), and monetary commitments (e.g., Broz 
2002). 
An interesting example worth noting in detail is from Dorussen and Mo (2001). In 
their seminal work, they point out that little attention had been heeded to the longevity and 
end of economic sanctions. In shedding light on this topic, they found that taking audience 
costs theory into consideration elicited a helpful explanation for the longevity and end of 
economic sanctions. In basic terms, their argument was that the leader of the sender 
(government who imposed the economic sanctions) generated audience costs as a 
commitment strategy to convince the target (government who suffers the economic 
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sanctions) that future costs are inevitable as long as the sanctioned state is unwilling to give 
in (Dorussen and Mo 2001). In this application, the authors looked at the mechanism of 
audience costs as a factor affecting the nature of economic sanctions. More specifically, 
audience costs were confirmed to play a role in prolonging the longevity of economic 
sanctions when the cost of retracting exceeded the cost of continuing economic sanctions.
Therefore, the authors concluded that only audience costs as a strategic commitment help 
the sender bring forth target concessions.
The aforementioned studies illustrate considerable attention for the functions of 
audience costs theory. As a result, audience costs theory continued to gain interest from
many scholars--especially those interested in international relations. Eventually, further 
examinations of the theory looked for its existence rather than for its implications which
were conjectured on studies based on the, previously mentioned, democratic-autocratic 
dichotomy.
3.4. The Democracy-Autocracy Dichotomy
For the most part, democratic leaders were assumed to be held accountable for their actions
more often than non-democratic leaders. Correspondingly, the ability to generate or incur 
domestic audience costs was initially widely recognized to only correlate with democracies. 
In 1994, Fearon first conjectured that democracies should be, on average, better at 
generating domestic audience costs than non-democracies, and hence gain the ability to 
commit and signal resolve. As a result, non-democracies did not receive much attention in 
respect to the level of variance observed in audience costs within authoritarian regimes
until the work of Weeks (2008).
The democracy-autocracy dichotomy was a hypothesis of the theory that received 
plenty of attention from early contributions in the literature. Despite the empirical support
for the audience costs’ indirect implications, a research design employing a direct test
towards the existence of audience costs had not been employed yet. This dichotomy 
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received early support from Partell and Palmer (1999:402), where they illustrated empirics 
in favor of democratic states in generating high audience costs because they were thought 
to have a politically constrained executive. In addition, Prins (2003:68) focused on the 
association between the democratic peace theory and domestic audience costs. In doing so, 
he argued that “the believability of audience costs and resolve depends in part on the 
stability of domestic political structures.” In turn, this gave further reason to believe that the 
political stability of a state enacted the presence of audience costs.
On the other hand, Slantchev (2006) conducted a thorough investigation of how 
audience costs arise and how they come into existence. He considered how previous 
analyses assume that audience costs existed and that they are related to regime type, more 
particularly, higher in democracies and lower in non-democracies (2006:470). Slantchev 
focused on linking domestic audience costs to the citizens’ ability to hold leadership 
accountable for pursuing unfavorable policies they would not want if they had the same 
information about the quality of such policies. 
By taking into account two information transmission mechanisms; politicians and 
the media, Slantchev (2006) arrived at interesting results that did not fall in line with the 
democratic-autocratic dichotomy conjecture in audience costs theory. The results suggested 
“that perfect audience costs can arise endogenously only in mixed regimes where the costs 
of repressing dissent are neither too high nor too low” (Slantchev, 2006:470). This result 
not only deviated from the democratic-autocratic dichotomy hypothesis, but it also paved 
the way for Weeks (2008) and a line of other scholars after her. In her seminal work, 
Weeks (2008) found that domestic elites present in certain non-democratic regimes act as a 
domestic audience for non-democratic political leaders, which in turn enables the presence 
of audience costs in autocratic or mixed regimes. Her pioneering work eventually led future 
research in audience costs theory to sway away from the conventional democracy-
autocracy dichotomy.
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3.5. Problems with the Democracy-Autocracy Dichotomy
With time, new studies rendered the notion of regime type and audience costs theory
problematic. New perspectives on the nature of regimes revealed variations within these 
regimes with respect to their capacity to generate audience costs (see, Weeks 2008; Conrad, 
Conrad, and Young 2012; Kinne and Marinov 2012). Interestingly, before these new 
perspectives emerged in the field, few scholars had already touched upon the possibility 
that the common assumption of regime type and audience costs can be, after all, 
misleading. As previously mentioned, Slantchev (2006:446) realized that if “one relied 
solely on strategic sources of information (government, opposition parties), citizens of 
either democracies or autocracies are unlikely to learn enough to credibly threaten to 
sanction their leader for bad behavior.” In other words, how were citizens supposed to 
understand when to punish their leader for issuing empty threats?  In another case, Partell 
and Palmer (1999:404), discovered that their results of Fearon’s model suggested that 
audience costs exerted influence over which side to a dispute will back down, but the 
connection between audience costs and regime type remained unclear.
New perspectives on regime types came about when Jessica L. Weeks (2008)
shattered the common assumption adopted by many audience cots theorists. In her article, 
Weeks argues and provides empirical evidence that domestic elites in certain non-
democracies have incentives to punish leaders for reneging on foreign policy threats.
Weeks (2008:36) does this by proposing “three necessary conditions for generating 
audience costs; 1) the incentive and ability for domestic political groups to coordinate to 
punish the leader, 2) domestic negative views for backing down, 3) and whether outsiders 
can observe the possibility of domestic dissatisfaction.” She then argues that certain 
variations of autocratic regimes meet these requirements, and then statistically supports her 
hypothesis with empirical data. In doing so, she manages to show that threats made by 
democracies are not more credible than threats made by autocratic regimes.
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Some autocratic regimes, she argues, meet the necessary conditions for generating 
politically significant audience costs, thus their actions are held accountable by high 
ranking officials whom they share power with or receive support from. However, she also 
notes that some autocratic leaders use surveillance and punishment strategies to prevent 
elite coordination, while others occlude their foreign policy decisions from domestic 
observation. As a result, such autocratic regimes cannot generate audience costs (Weeks 
2008). For example, leaders in some autocracies may not be held accountable by the people
or domestic elites, if any.
On another related note, Kinne and Marinov (2012) use data on the reciprocation 
rates in militarized crises to show that even electoral authoritarian regimes are able to 
credibly signal resolve. In their study, the authors argue that some non-democratic electoral 
processes are mechanisms of credible signaling. And they further find that nondemocratic 
regimes also have the capacity to be held domestically accountable, and by the same coin, 
credibly signal resolve. In brief, the authors argued that if electoral bias decreases and the 
vulnerability of the incumbent increases, then the electoral process could be held 
accountable, hence enhancing the ability to credibly signal resolve.
In sum, these studies of the theory rendered the idea of a dichotomy of political 
regimes problematic. Further studies on the theory continued to build upon these findings 
and provided new empirical advancements that led to a furthered understanding of whether 
audience costs actually existed or not. Such studies not only challenged the theoretical 
argument, but also brought forth theoretical backlashes to the logic of the theory.
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3.6. Empirical Advancements on Audience Costs
Empirical advancements that clarified the existence of audience costs emanated from novel 
conceptual functions of the theory. These advancements went on to explain disparate
perspectives of audience costs theory. For example, several important contributions further 
research in audience costs to explain intriguing topics such as; why leaders or regimes with 
extreme capabilities to signal resolve choose instead to go private (see Baum 2004); peace 
and rapprochement (see Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011); and even why 
terrorism occurs (see Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012). These novel approaches to 
audience costs theory are non-symmetrical with previous studies in the literature that had 
suggested, for the most part, that the ability to generate domestic audience costs was seen 
as a strategy of benefit for leaders to successfully signal resolve. While these empirical 
advancements led to more coherent explanations for the existence of audience costs, it is 
also worth taking into account the theoretical backlashes they introduced against the 
theoretical argument. In 2004, Baum (2004) focused on the role of audience costs in the
United States. As a democratic nation, U.S leaders are theorized to have the capacity to 
generate audience costs when publicly issuing a threat or promise. However, Baum (2004) 
delves on how it has long been held true that American leaders do not disclose any highly 
classified information to the American public--especially when conditions prove 
unfavorable. In fact, most political matters that are believed to incite any sort of discontent 
from the public are commonly known to be covert. And despite all the potential credibility 
that domestic audience costs are theorized to provide for the U.S, there is still an inclination 
to avoid domestic audience costs. With this in mind, Baum (2004) explored the role of 
domestic public opinion in influencing the decision of American leaders. What he found 
through an analysis of U.S. behavior in all international crises between1946 and 1994, was 
that an excess in audience costs actually causes undesirable costs for the president as a 
democratic leader if failure is met. In addition, Baum (2004:627) found that when the 
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“United States has no significant national security interests at stake, presidents will be 
hesitant to seek the public spotlight unless they are fairly confident of success.” In 
reflection to Baum’s empirical evidence it could inferred that a good amount of American 
political matters are most likely done through undisclosed deep politics that remain 
unbeknown to domestic audiences. As a result, high audience costs are avoided with “quiet 
diplomacy” (Baum 2004:628). The empirical evidence from this work further corroborates 
the existence of audience costs; however, it also presents a theoretical backlash to the 
theory as it purports the presence of audience costs to backfire against the leader.
Another interesting case that audience cost theory was associated with was a study 
of peace and rapprochement. In this particular case, scholars were able to piece together the 
effects of audience costs on the aftermath of a natural disaster-shared by rivals entangled in 
a protracted conflict, as impetus towards peace and rapprochement (Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, 
and Radziszewski 2011). Through newspaper content analysis and time-series analysis, 
they were able to detect the impact of audience costs in the aftermath of two major
earthquakes that shocked Turkey-Greece, and India-Pakistan. Ultimately, based on their 
research they arrived at two interesting conclusions. 1) If there is a presence of routine 
violence, even if a natural disaster occurs there is no room for rapprochement because most 
citizens impose audience costs on leaders who seek warm relations. 2) On the other hand, 
when enduring rivalries are ‘locked in’ constituents impose audience costs towards 
rapprochement. (Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011:271). In the end, this 
empirical advancement introduced a very different perspective on audience costs theory.
Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2012) brought forth an intriguing perspective on 
audience costs theory. They employ audience costs as a contextual variable to measure the 
likelihood of terrorism in autocratic regimes. In general, Conrad et al. argue that the 
differences in the audience costs generated by non-democratic leaders explain why some 
non-democracies experience more terrorism than others. More specifically, this study is 
based on Weeks’ (2008) classification of regime types, and argues that dictatorships with 
the capacity and resources to generate more audience costs would consequently experience 
more terrorism than autocratic regimes that incur relatively low audience costs. The logic is 
that terrorists would choose to execute a terrorist attack, if and only, they could achieve an 
audience to witness their activity, and hence create costs for the leader or regime in power.
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Their contribution to the theory gave rise to an interesting implication that did not agree 
with the theoretical consensus that had long established the ability to generate audience 
costs as a favorable and beneficial ability for war deterrence. Their interpretation of the 
theory vis-a-vis terrorism salience rendered the presence of audience costs as a catalyst for 
welcoming terrorist attacks. The empirical evidence found for this logic advanced support 
for the existence of audience costs theory, but it also draws near to a theoretical backlash 
against the initial consensus that favored the ability of generating audience costs. As a 
result, these studies not only furthered an understanding of whether audience costs actually 
existed or not, but they also introduced disparate outlooks on the way the theory can be 
conceptualized.
3.7. Issues with the Empirics for Audience Costs Theory
From the beginning, some scholars have taken issue with the empirical support for 
audience costs theory. The discontent with the extant empirical evidence is for the most 
part due to the methodological quandaries present in most research. As mentioned earlier, 
studies of the theory have been indirect on account of strategic selection bias and partial 
observability. Tomz (2007) and a number of scholars who took issue with not the 
theoretical validity, but rather quality of the empirics, acknowledged that many early 
studies examined the theory through indirect implications. Direct evidence of audience 
costs theory was first found by Tomz in 2007. The empirical evidence was obtained from
public surveys conducted among American citizens. Through these experiments, Tomz 
designed fictitious scenarios and asked American voters whether they approved or 
disapproved of different leaders who openly made a foreign policy threat and then chose to 
back down. The results not only pointed towards the presence of audience costs, but they 
also indicated that audience costs increase as leaders further escalate their foreign threats.  
Nonetheless, before these studies took place, earlier studies had already taken issue 
with the empirical evidence of audience costs. More specifically, some theorists pointed 
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towards notions of incongruity when examining and applying a theory that could otherwise 
not be literally observed. For example, as Smith (1998:623) sought to better understand the 
theory itself, he pondered on the thought of how the concept of audience cost was largely 
problematic because it was simply assumed to exist. For Smith, audience costs theory was
not tenable and even misleading (Smith 1998:623). As a result, he found himself focusing 
on the micro-foundations from the public perspective of the logic in order to better attach 
meaning to the theory.  
In another instance, Slantchev (2006:446) expresses how audience costs are for the 
most part assumed to be there, hence leading to his question; “how do they arise?” Lastly, 
Haynes (2012) takes a closer look at empirical evidence of domestic audience costs in 
causing electoral accountability for democratic leaders. Haynes (2012) reconsiders the 
suggestion that democratic leaders’ electoral accountability lends him or her significant 
advantage in crisis-bargaining situations by examining whether “lame-duck” presidents--
leaders who are not eligible for reelection--benefit less from this significant advantage. 
Ultimately, his examination of the empirics did not illustrate any significant difference for 
democratic “lame-duck” leadership status.  
The aforementioned studies, albeit skeptical of empirical support for the audience 
costs theory, are relatively insignificant when compared to how Tomz (2007) took issue 
with the empirical evidence at hand. The seminal work of Tomz (2007) solved the 
empirical conundrum of finding direct empirical evidence for audience costs. The main 
impetus that drove his experiment was to clarify if audience costs actually existed. A
fundamental question that Tomz (2007) asked was if constituents would punish leaders for 
reneging? And in designing the series of experiments, Tomz made sure that his intentions 
to find direct evidence for audience costs were consistent. Tomz looked at the increase of 
audience costs in tandem with the level of escalation. In other words, he looked into both 
the realistic costs for backing down and the micro-foundations to clarify the intentions of 
the public opinion. In doing so, his analysis not only showed that audience costs existed 
across a range of conditions, but that audience costs also increased with the level of 
escalation. In addition, Tomz found that, among the population, politically active citizens 
acted more negatively towards empty threats. And lastly, the empirical evidence also 
indicated that audience costs emanated from citizens being concerned about the 
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international reputation of the country. Overall, Tomz (2007) found direct empirical 
evidence of audience cost by not testing the theory through its implications.
In 2009, Tomz (2009) examined domestic audience costs through a series of 
experiments embedded in interviews. He wanted to know what made international military 
threats credible. In light of this, he took on the presence of audience costs as an important 
factor for the credibility of international military threats. In doing so, Tomz developed a 
model of a military crisis with domestic audience costs. With this model, Tomz (2009) 
focused on three themes of domestic audience costs. In particular, he looked at the attitudes 
of citizens when leaders back down after openly making a threat, the expectations leaders 
hold from the domestic public after reneging, and how audience costs are perceived in 
different institutional settings. He brought into account his previous work from 2007 in 
order to assess the attitudes that citizens express about leaders who renege on a foreign 
threat. As for assessing whether leaders expect audience costs or no reaction from the 
public, Tomz in collaboration with three assistants from the University of Stanford 
conducted in-person interviews with British parliamentarians. And finally, in order to 
examine how domestic political institutions affect the expectations of leaders, Tomz and 
company asked British parliamentarians: “which type of leader—the leader of a democracy 
or the leader of a dictatorship—would be more likely to lose power at home if they backed 
down in a military confrontation, instead of following through on the threats they made?” 
(Tomz 2009:8-9). In the end, Tomz (2009) reaches three conclusions. He concludes that 
citizens punish leaders for escalating crises and then backing down. And that those leaders
actually expect this kind of reaction from domestic audiences. Lastly, he concludes that 
“the simple distinction between democratic and autocratic institutions is not as salient as 
scholars have previously assumed” (Tomz 2009:10). Ultimately, these findings further 
contributed to direct evidence of audience costs theory.
And finally, other scholars who have actually taken issue with not the quality of 
empirics, but rather the theoretical validity of audience costs theory, brought forth critical
theoretical critiques to the theory. One particular example of this is a critique of the theory 
by Trachtenberg (2011). Trachtenberg does a thorough historical analysis of events that had
been presumed as instances of audience costs by Schultz (2001). Trachtenberg (2011)
ultimately provoked many theorists and an array of response essays from the journal of 
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security studies (see, inter alia, Gartzke and Lupu 2012; Mercer 2012; Levy 2012; Shultz 
2012; Slantchev 2012), most of which sided with Trachtenberg’s (2012) arguments.
The contributions made by Tomz (2007, 2009) have indeed extended the empirical 
frontier of audience costs theory. The studies took place in the U.S. and British setting. And 
both studies were focused on the role of audience costs in hard power foreign policy—
militarized crises. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, soft power foreign policy tools also 
play an increasing role in international politics. As shown before on the previous chapter, 
the discourse on soft power and hard power foreign policy tools is a growing topic in 
international relations literature. More particularly, a talk on Turkish soft power has
emanated from Turkey’s role as third party actor and regional cultural hub. In this respect, I 
use the Turkish setting to examine the role of domestic audience costs across different 
foreign policy tools.
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4.  METHODS
To directly study the role of audience costs in soft and hard power foreign policy decisions 
while avoiding the problem of selection bias, I designed and carried out a series of 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were translated to Turkish and administered to a 
convenience sample of 100 Turkish adults from Istanbul in 2014. The sample was mostly 
drawn from Sabanci University students, students and professionals studying at an
“English-as-a-second-language” (about 40 each from the two groups). Although I 
employed a convenience sample, the demographic distributions are not skewed. Table 1 
illustrates some of the demographic characteristics of my sample. Not surprisingly, the 
majority of the sample is comprised of students with ages under 25. That said, the sample 
also consists of a decent size of professionals. The sex ratio is close to 50%.
All participants who took the questionnaires received an introductory script: “Hello, 
thank you for accepting to be a part of this study. In this study, I present to you a set of scenarios
about the decisions that leaders make when they are faced with foreign politics. You will read 4 
different foreign political situations that leaders are often faced with. The leaders might react 
differently to these situations. The scenarios will be described to you one by one, and you will be 
asked to agree or disagree with the leader’s decision. Please answer the questions according to 
the order given. The leaders from the scenarios are not related with the current leader, they are 
imaginary.” stated in the introductory script, participants then read four different artificial 
scenarios about Turkish foreign policy crises in which the situation at stake was dependent on the 
type of foreign policy; in this case two soft power foreign policy scenarios and two hard power 
foreign policy scenarios. I designed all the foreign policy crisis scenarios based on Joseph S. 
Nye’s (1990) instrumental logic of foreign policy action, meaning that if the goal of the foreign 
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policy was to force others to make a cost-benefit analysis through coercing or coaxing strategies, 
then one could talk about hard power. However, if the goal of the foreign policy was to ensure 
cooperation and that others would automatically follow the lead of the power-holder due to the 
power of attraction, then one could talk about soft power (Oğuzlu 2007). In this way, the two 
scenarios I designed for hard power foreign policy are the following: a Military Intervention
scenario where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on a threat to militarily intervene in a 
neighboring country in order to prevent country A from invading country B; and an Economic 
Sanctions scenario where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on a threat of imposing economic 
sanctions on country X for invading country Y, both neighboring countries. As for soft power 
foreign policy, I designed the following scenarios: a Border Blockade scenario where the Turkish 
Prime Minister reneges on a publicly issued statement to close Turkish borders and halt trade, 
including Turkish Airline commercial flights, with country P in response to country P’s 
shortcomings in gas exports to Turkey; and a Foreign Aid Scenario where the Turkish Prime 
Minister reneges on his/her promise to maintain a constant flow of foreign aid support to country 
Z—an economically failing state.
For simplification purposes; from this point on, I will refer to each scenario in the 
following manner: Military Intervention scenario; Economic Sanctions scenario; Border 
Blockade scenario; and Foreign Aid scenario. The Military Intervention and Economic Sanctions 
scenarios are instances of hard power foreign policy crises while the Border Blockade and 
Foreign Aid scenarios are instances of soft power foreign policy crises. These foreign policy 
tools have been shown to be meaningful in past and present instances of Turkish foreign policy 
(see, inter alia, Oğuzlu 2007; Altunışık 2008; Kalın 2011; “Republic of Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs” 2011). 
All scenarios were given to the respondents as vignettes in which the prime minister 
issued an empty commitment. The vignettes for each foreign crisis scenario are illustrated below
in Table 2. In order to prevent preconceived attitudes of the participants from affecting their 
perception of the crisis at hand, I chose to not name the countries involved in the scenarios. 
Instead I labeled the countries with random and ambiguous alphabetical letters. In addition, the 
questionnaires in which the scenarios were presented varied in four different sequences in order 
to avoid order effects. These four versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned to the 
respondents. 
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample of the Study
Characteristic Percentage (N=100)
Sex
Female 46
Male 54
Education
Primary + Some High School 6
High School 45
Some College 3
College 36
Masters 9
PhD 1
Age
18-24 59
25-34 27
35-44 4
45-54 5
55-64 5
Occupation
Student 62
Part-time 12
Full-time 17
Unemployed 4
Retired/Other 5
Yearly Income (TL)
<10,000 16
10,000-24,999 27
25,000-49,999 26
50,000-74,999 14
>75,000 17
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For each scenario, the background information set the stage and described a situation in 
which the Turkish Prime Minister was faced with a foreign policy crisis that required immediate 
attention. Having read the background information, participants learned how the Turkish Prime 
Minister handled the situation. In all scenarios, the respondents received a situation in which the 
prime minister made a commitment but did not carry it out. The language in all scenarios was 
intentionally neutral and free of any subjective phrases in order to avoid any idiosyncratic 
attitudes.
After respondents interpreted a given scenario, I asked whether the respondent 
“approved,”“disapproved,” or “neither approved nor disapproved” of the way the Turkish Prime
Minister handled the situation. An immediate follow-up open-ended question asked the 
respondent to state why she/he approved or disapproved of the prime minister’s decision. After 
writing in their responses, the respondents were asked to proceed to a third question. Using a 1 
through 6 scale (1 being the most important and 6 being the least important), the respondents 
were asked to rank items among a list of common rationales people have for approving or 
disapproving of their leader’s decision. They were asked to rank the following: maintaining the 
international reputation of Turkey; upholding the moral responsibility of the Turkish 
Republic; strengthening Turkey’s role as a regional leader; maintaining healthy relations with 
neighboring countries; protecting the national security of the Turkish Republic; and other. The 
entire questionnaire used for this thesis can be found in the appendix.
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TABLE 2.   Vignettes of Foreign Crisis Scenarios
Hard Power Foreign Policy Soft Power Foreign Policy
Military Intervention
Scenario
Economic Sanctions 
Scenario
Border Blockade 
Scenario
Foreign Aid 
Scenario
“Country A sent its 
military to take over 
Country B - a neighboring 
country of Turkey. The 
Prime Minister of the 
Turkish Republic publicly 
stated that if the attack 
continued, the Turkish 
military would prevent 
Country A from invading 
Country B. He then sent 
troops to Country B and 
prepared them for war. 
However, Country A 
continued to invade 
Country B. The Turkish 
Prime minister then 
decided to withdraw 
Turkish troops from 
Country B without sending 
them into battle.”
“Country X sent its 
military to take over 
Country Y - a 
neighboring country of 
Turkey. The Prime 
Minister of the Turkish 
Republic publicly stated 
that if the attack 
continued, Turkey 
would impose economic 
sanctions on Country X. 
He criticized Country X 
and attempted to get 
other neighboring 
countries to join him in 
imposing economic 
sanctions on Country X. 
However, Country X 
continued to invade 
Country Y. The Turkish 
Prime minister then 
decided to withdraw his 
claim without 
attempting to impose 
any economic sanctions 
to Country X.”
“Country P, being an 
important supplier of 
gas for Turkey, has 
drastically reduced its 
supply of gas to Turkey 
- without any 
explanation. The Prime 
Minister of the Turkish 
Republic publicly stated 
that if the flow of supply 
did not resume to its 
original flow, Turkey 
would prohibit Turkish 
Airlines from operating 
within Country P, and in 
addition it would close 
its borders with Country 
P. He began talks with 
Turkish Airlines and 
sent additional border 
patrols to enforce the 
border with Country P. 
However, Country P 
continued to reduce its 
flow of gas supply to 
Turkey. The Turkish 
Prime minister then 
decided to withdraw his 
claim of prohibiting 
Turkish Airlines to 
operate within Country 
P and never closed its 
borders.”
“The citizens of 
Country Z have been 
receiving foreign aid 
from Turkey for more 
than a year. Recently 
the citizens of Country 
Z have been 
experiencing 
escalating security 
threats from internal 
dissidents (rebels). The 
Prime Minister of the 
Turkish Republic 
publicly stated that 
even if the security 
threats continued, 
Turkey would continue 
its flow of aid and all 
other support in order 
to maintain the peace. 
He then made sure 
there was steady flow 
of financial support 
necessary to maintain 
the peace. However, 
the dissidents
continued to molest 
and violently attack the 
citizens of Country Z. 
The Turkish Prime 
minister then decided 
to withdraw all 
Turkish professionals 
along with all other aid 
from Country Z 
without attempting to 
maintain the peace.
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As mentioned earlier, my research design builds upon the work done by Tomz (2007). 
This approach, however, differs in that it not only offers the opportunity to directly measure 
domestic audience costs, but it also measures the role audience costs play across different types 
of foreign policy threats issued. I recognize that experimental approaches are vulnerable to 
problems with external validity. For example, respondents may behave different when answering 
a questionnaire and when actually experiencing a foreign policy crisis. Similarly my convenience 
sample is not representative of the Turkish population. Nonetheless, the data collected from the
questionnaires provide a novel understanding of audience costs theory.
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5.  FINDINGS
5.1. Audience Costs for Hard and Soft Power Foreign Policy
The questionnaires employed in this study offer a new perspective on the role audience costs play 
in the type of foreign policy at stake. Past research shows direct evidence of audience costs for 
leaders who make a threat and then renege during an interstate crisis (see, Tomz 2007, 2009). In 
this regard, if a disparity exists on how audience costs differ between hard and soft power foreign 
policy, respondents, on average, should disapprove more of one type of foreign policy over the 
other. If, on the other hand, respondents equally disparage leaders for reneging on their 
commitment in both types of foreign policy, then the frequency of disapproval should be 
approximately the same across all four scenarios. 
Before conducting statistical analyses, I checked for missing data by making sure all parts 
in the questionnaires were answered. Some demographic and political background questions 
were deliberately left blank by a number of participants because they simply did not want to 
disclose such information. More specifically, the demographic variable of income was left blank 
in five questionnaires, while the variable for ideology was left blank in one questionnaire. I filled 
in a total of six missing values with its covariate corresponding median as such imputation does 
not introduce bias to the analyses conducted later.
I examined how the participants responded to the prime minister’s decision in each 
scenario. Evidence of audience costs are illustrated below for each scenario in Table 3. For each 
decision the prime minister made, the table gives the percentage of respondents who 
disapproved, approved, or expressed a moderate viewpoint. Table 3 illustrates that the 
respondents were most sensitive to the prime minister’s reneging on an economic sanction threat 
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(62 %) followed by reneging on a threat of border blockade (56%).  Forty three percent of the 
respondents partially or fully disagreed with the prime minister’s choice to not to fulfill Turkey’s 
promise to extend foreign aid. Finally, my findings show that the Turkish respondents least 
objected (34%) to the prime minister’s choice to back down from his threat to employ the 
Turkish military. 
These initial results render interesting insights regarding audience costs and the type of 
foreign policy tools (hypothetically) utilized in the Turkish context. While the data demonstrate 
respondents indeed distinguish between different types of foreign policy tools, sample means do 
not demonstrate a clear relationship between the ‘hardness’ of a foreign policy tool and the 
amount of audience costs it creates. Rather, we observe that the respondents are most punishing 
(and most understanding) for one hard and one soft power foreign policy tool each. Interestingly, 
the respondents were most ‘understanding’ when the leader reneged on a promise to use the 
‘hardest’ of the foreign policy tools, that is military intervention. And they were also most 
‘understanding’ when the leader reneged on a promise to maintain the flow of foreign aid to 
failing state, the ‘softest’ of the foreign policy tools. This altogether suggests that the public may 
full be aware of the costs of military intervention and of the costs of extending aid to a failing 
state, ex-ante and ex-post, and thus not be as hasty to punish a leader for reneging on a bluff. All 
this resonates with recent research regarding how domestic political conditions can shape the 
way in which audience costs are imposed on a reneging leader (e.g., Levedusky and Horowitz 
2012). 
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TABLE 3.   The domestic political cost for making empty commitments
Public reaction 
to reneging on 
a threat of 
Military 
Intervention 
(%)
Public reaction 
to reneging on 
a threat of 
imposing 
Economic 
Sanctions (%)
Public reaction 
to reneging on 
a threat of 
Border 
Blockade (%)
Public reaction 
to reneging on 
the promise of 
continuing 
Foreign Aid (%)
Definitely Agree 20 6 7 13
Partially Agree 29 13 24 25
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree
17 19 13 19
Partially Disagree 19 28 25 18
Definitely Disagree 15 34 31 25
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
% partially or fully 
disagree
34 62 56 43
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5.2. What Factors Influence The Role of Audience Costs?
Given the discrepancy of how respondents approved or disapproved of the prime ministers’ 
decisions across all foreign policy crisis scenarios, it is fundamental to understand how they 
varied. Towards this end, I conducted ordered logistic regression for each scenario in order to 
look more closely at the role of audience costs in Turkish hard and soft power foreign policy. 
More specifically, I look at factors that influence the voters’ approval or disapproval of a leader’s 
decision to back down from a foreign policy commitment. 
In this study, Turkish citizens were asked if they definitely agree, partially agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, partially disagree, or definitely disagree of their leader’s decision to back 
down from a commitment in four different foreign crises.2 In all four models, I employ the same 
five independent variables, namely (i) self-placement of the respondent on an ideological scale,
(ii) the respondent’s sex, (iii) the level of political activism the individual declares, (iv) the
respondent’s approximate income, and (v) the average age of the participant was also collected. I 
have reason to expect different factors to have varying impacts between the levels of approval 
and disapproval across scenarios of a same foreign policy. For example, some factors that may 
influence voters in the Military Intervention scenario might not have the same impact for voters 
in the Economic Sanctions scenario. It is possible that a respondent may not care about what 
Turkey does in an economic sanctions episode, but may gauge a leader’s competence by looking 
at how that leader acts in a militarized crisis. Alternatively, a respondent may think that an 
economic sanctions scenario can be a good opportunity to manifest Turkey’s resolve while
risking a military adventure for such an endeavor may be too costly. More broadly, I expect a 
variance in the way participants approve or disapprove of the leaders’ decision across all four
scenarios. Since my dependent variable is an ordinal one, I will employ ordered logit regression 
models to see whether the five aforementioned independent variables significantly affect the way
                                               
2
An underlying assumption here is that a voter who does not agree with a leader’s policy will electorally punish that 
leader. The link between policy approval and voting behavior can be an interesting topic for further study.
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an individual agrees or disagrees with the political leader’s decision to renege on a foreign policy 
threat or promise.3
All four dependent variables are different with respect to the type of foreign policy and 
tested against the same set of covariates. Hard power foreign policy tools are depicted in two 
scenarios; Military Intervention scenario and Economic Sanctions scenario, while the Border 
Blockade scenario and Foreign Aid scenario constitute soft-power policy tools. For this section, I 
will refer to the aforementioned ordered logistic regression models in the following matter: 
Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4.
The estimate of an ordered logistic regression model for Military Intervention, sex, 
political activism, income, age, and ideology; is illustrated in Table 4. The p-value of 0.03 
illustrates that the model as a whole, has statistically significant explanatory power, as compared 
to the null model with no predictors.
The estimates for Model 1 illustrate that while income and political activism are 
statistically significant, ideology, sex, and age are not. Given this information, for income, it can 
be said that for a one category unit increase in income, there will be a 0.37 increase in the log 
odds of being in a higher level of disapproval with the prime minister’s decision, given all of the 
other variables in the model are held constant.4 Two different causal mechanisms can account for 
this finding. First, research on American politics has long suggested that more affluent 
individuals tend to follow and even influence politics, and foreign policy for that matter (see 
inter alia, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Page,
Bartels, and Seawright 2013). As such, these individuals may be more sensitive to ‘performance 
measures’ in foreign policy. Alternatively, it may be that the more affluent (and hence possibly 
more educated) parts of society tend to be more critical of government policy makers.
A one unit increase in political activism, on the other hand, suggests a 0.57 increase in the 
log odds of being in a higher level of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister’s decision, 
ceteris paribus. In other words, the less politically active respondents are more likely to approve 
the prime minister’s decision. At its face value, this is an interesting finding that falls in tandem 
with the previous finding on income. More politically active individuals may be more critical of 
                                               
3
For designing the ordered logistic regression models I referred to Algresti (1996, 2002). And for interpretation, I 
referred to Liao (1994) and Long and Freese (2006) 
4
Note that a higher level of the dependent variable denotes disagreement not agreement.
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the tough choices a leader may be faced with in foreign policy matters. Another possible 
explanation for this inverse relationship may also relate to the political culture in Turkey where 
the reverence for authority is a common norm among Turkish voters. This could explain why 
Turkish voters, although politically inactive, would remain comfortable with, and thus approve of 
any decisions taken by the current government in office.
As for the Economic Sanctions scenario, Model 2 has a p-value of 0.073 for the chi-
squared test. While failing the conventional statistical threshold of 0.05, 0.073 is still notable for 
a possibly under-specified model. In this scenario, ideology is the only statistically significant
covariate. Furthermore, it could only be said that for a one unit increase in ideology, there will be 
a 0.23 decrease in the log odds of being in a level of approval for the Turkish Prime Minister’s 
decision, given that all the other variables in the model are held constant. This suggests that 
respondents who placed themselves further on the right of the ideological spectrum were more 
likely to approve of their prime ministers decision to renege on imposing economic sanctions. 
This finding suggests that partisanship may precede the evaluation of foreign policy, and not vice 
versa. Although the p-values of political activism and income slightly exceed the 0.05 threshold 
(with p-values of 0.063 and 0.079, respectively), the findings still indicate some influence 
towards the disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister’s decision to back down. More 
specifically, for a one unit increase in political activism, there will be a 0.49 increase in the log 
odds of being in a higher of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister’s decision. And as for a 
one unit increase in income, there will be a 0.25 increase in the log odds of being in a higher 
level of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister’s decision.
Interestingly, both hard power scenarios were cases in which income and political 
activism had some influence in the role of audience costs. In particular, respondents with higher 
incomes and higher political activity appeared to be more prone towards disapproving with the 
prime ministers’ decision to renege on hard power foreign policy tools. It could be that more 
affluent and politically active respondents might find failure in hard-power foreign policy more
threatening towards the national reputation in the international arena. Hence, for the sake of “face 
saving” (i.e., maintaining a good image and avoiding the embarrassment of looking bad)
respondents with fiscal and political influence could find it righteous to sanction a leader who 
fails to continue with an openly issued coercive threat.   
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TABLE 4.   Hard Power Ordered Logistic Regression Tables
Military Intervention Scenario
(n = 100)
Economic Sanctions Scenario
(n = 100)
Variables B (SE) P-value B (SE) P-value
Ideology -0.06 (0.09) 0.50 -0.22 (0.09) 0.018**
Sex 0.34 (0.40) 0.40 -0.38 (0.38) 0.30
Political 
Activism
0.57 (0.27) 0.04** 0.49 (0.26) 0.06*
Income 0.37 (0.15) 0.01** 0.26 (0.15) 0.079*
Age -0.18 (0.17) 0.30 -0.03 (0.19) 0.84
Cut 1 1.06 (0.98) - -2.51 (1.01) -
Cut 2 2.53 (1.01) - -1.15 (0.98) -
Cut 3 3.27 (1.02) - -0.09 (0.96) -
Cut 4 4.40 (1.05) - 1.14 (0.96) -
Prob>chi2  0.03 0.07
Pseudo R2  0.04 0.03
Notes:  *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05;  ***p < 0.001 
TABLE 5.   Soft Power Ordered Logistic Regression Tables
Border Blockade Scenario
(n = 100)
Foreign Aid Scenario
(n = 100)
Variables B (SE) P-value B (SE) P-value
Ideology -0.15 (0.09) 0.10 -0.08 (0.09) 0.35
Sex -0.38 (0.38) 0.31 0.005 (0.38) 0.98
Political 
Activism
0.22 (0.26) 0.41 0.29 (0.27) 0.28
Income 0.025 (0.14) 0.86 0.15 (0.13) 0.25
Age -0.31 (0.17) 0.06* 0.05 (0.18) 0.74
Cut 1 -3.89 (1.05) - -0.97 (0.95) -
Cut 2 -2.03 (0.98) - 0.45 (0.94) -
Cut 3 -1.43 (0.97) - 1.24 (0.95) -
Cut 4 -0.30 (0.96) - 2.07 (0.96) -
Prob>chi2  0.10 0.74
Pseudo R2  0.03 0.008
Notes:  *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05;  ***p < 0.001 
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5.3. Juxtaposing the Results
In placing together, side by side, the estimates of the ordered logistic regression models, it is 
apparent that towards hard power foreign policy, the estimates from both scenarios show that 
some factors have some influence in the way respondents approve or disapprove. The Military 
Intervention scenario being statistically significant shows that income and political activism 
significantly affect the way the respondents’ make their choice. While on the one hand, it can be 
concluded that respondents with higher incomes are more inclined to disapprove of the prime 
minister’s decision to back down. On the other hand, respondents who are less politically active 
are more inclined to approve of the prime minister’s decision to back down. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that more affluent and politically active respondents are more likely to penalize the 
prime minister for reneging on militarized threats. In contrast, these effects are not the same for 
the Economic Sanctions scenario, which is also a hard power foreign policy tool. In fact, the 
model for the Economic Sanctions scenario only showed ideology to have some influence on 
how respondents approved of the prime minister’s decision. More specifically, it is observed that 
respondents who lean more towards the right in political ideology are more inclined to approve 
of the prime minister’s decision.
As for the soft power foreign policy scenarios, the same cannot be said about how these 
covariates influence the way respondents approve or disapprove of their leader’s decision to back 
down from a foreign policy commitment. On the contrary, both estimates for Model 3 Border 
Blockade and Model 4 Foreign Aid are as whole models statistically insignificant. Consequently, 
none of the variables are statistically significant enough to corroborate any change in the way 
voters feel about the empty commitments made by their prime minister.  Overall, across all four
scenarios the only significant variance in how covariate variables influence the way respondents 
feel about a prime minister’s empty commitment, is largely present for the hard power foreign 
policy scenarios, particularly Military Intervention. 
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6.  RATIONALES USED FOR JUDGING THE PRIME MINISTER’S DECISION
6.1. The Rationales
In all four scenarios, participants were prompted with a list of six common reasons people have 
for approving or disapproving of their leader’s decision. They were then asked to rank the 
reasons using a 1-6 scale, where 1 was considered to be the most important and 6 the least 
important. The results for all scenarios are distributed differently, illustrating a favorable skew 
towards particular reasons that are held very important or not important at all. The six rationales 
for approving or disapproving of the prime ministers’ decisions are the following: 1) maintaining 
the international reputation of Turkey; 2) upholding the moral responsibility of the Turkish 
Republic; 3) strengthening Turkey’s role as a regional leader; 4) maintaining healthy relations 
with neighboring countries: 5) protecting the national security of the Turkish Republic: and 6) 
other, where participants were asked to write-in their reason in mind. Ranking the rationales in 
each scenario differs with respect to the issues at stake in the particular foreign policy. 
Given that the four foreign crisis scenarios are different from each other and express a 
type of foreign policy, either hard or soft power. The way in which the participants rank the 
rationales for approving or disapproving of the their leader’s decision, is subject to variance 
depending on their feelings and opinions towards the specifics of the foreign policy scenario at 
hand. Despite obvious differences between all scenarios, in almost each case the rationale of 
protecting the national security of the Turkish republic was prevalent as being ranked the most 
important reason while Turkey’s role as a regional leader was ranked as the least important or 
unimportant rationale, next to the option of other rationales. In focusing on the rationales that 
were ranked as the most important, a similar pattern is discernible in respect to the order of all 
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rationales for approving or disapproving of the leader’s decision. More specifically, the ranking 
of the most important rationale differs to some noticeable extent in each scenario. Below the 
subtle differences can be distinguished in all four scenarios.
6.2. The “Most Important” Rationales in all Scenarios
Take for example, the Border Blockade scenario (see Table 6). In this scenario, the prime 
minister attempts to wield its economic influence, in other words its soft power, over a 
neighboring country. More specifically, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on 
following through with the threat of closing Turkish borders and halting trade, including services 
by Turkish Airlines, with country P in response to country P’s sudden shortcomings in gas 
exports to Turkey. Here among the most important ranked rationales, the concern for Turkey’s 
national security, more specifically, national economic security is ranked as the most important at 
37%. This rationale of concern is followed by another rationale of salient concern being Turkey’s 
international reputation at 34%. The salience of rationales for approving or disapproving of the 
prime minister’s decision in this scenario drops to 12% for keeping healthy relations with 
neighboring countries. This trend continues as the frequency for other rationales further 
plummets to 8% for Turkey’s moral responsibility, 6% for other reasons specified or non-
specified, and to 2% for Turkey’s role as a regional leader. As such, in the border blockade 
scenario, hard politics –such as economic security and Turkey’s international reputation seem to 
be the more salient than softer goals such as moral obligations and being a good neighbor.
In the Military Intervention scenario (see Table 6), where the Turkish Prime Minister 
flexes its hard power foreign policy capacity, the rationales highlighted by the respondents
slightly differ from the results of the Border Blockade scenario. In this hard power foreign policy 
scenario, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the threat of 
militarily preventing country A from invading country B. When participants were asked to 
decide on a rationale that they considered the most important when approving or disapproving of 
their leader’s decision, the results yet again leaned towards national security at 40%. However, 
42
this time the next most important rationale held by participants was Turkey maintaining a healthy 
relation with its neighboring countries at 22%. Turkey’s international reputation, for this case, 
was the third most important at 14%, followed closely by Turkey’s moral responsibility at 13%. 
And lastly, other reasons--not specified or specified, were held as the most important only 7% of 
the time while, again at the bottom, Turkey’s role as a regional leader was held the most 
important just 6% of the time. The results here seem to indicate that the respondents find 
Turkey’s national security and its relationship with neighboring countries to be very important 
rationales in considering whether to take a militarized risk or not. On the one hand, it could be 
that respondents see militarized entanglements as very costly political endeavors that could 
jeopardize their national security. On the other hand, it might be possible that respondents see the 
Turkish Prime Minister’s failure to militarily defend and assist a neighboring country undergoing 
invasion as a failure of Turkey being a good neighbor.
In the Economic Sanctions scenario (see Table 6), the results are somewhat similar to that 
of the Border Blockade scenario. In this scenario of Economic Sanctions, the Turkish Prime 
Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the threat of imposing economic sanctions 
on country X for invading country Y. This flexing of hard power foreign policy is a direct 
coercive economic threat to a neighboring country. Nonetheless, the way in which the 
participants ranked the most important rationales for approving or disapproving with the prime 
minister’s decision resulted in a somewhat similar fashion with those of the Border Blockade
scenario. Only this time, Turkey’s national security was joined by Turkey’s international 
reputation as both were ranked the most important 29% of the time. Turkey’s healthy relation 
with neighboring countries was ranked the most important only 17% of the time. Meanwhile, the 
moral responsibility of Turkey was considered the most important rationale just 8% of the time. 
And again, the two rationales that were least ranked as the most important were other reasons—
specified or not specified at 7%, and Turkey’s role as a regional leader at 6%. Although these 
two rationales do not fall far behind in this scenario, they continue to remain at the bottom.
Ultimately, these results also point out to the respondents being concerned with rationales which 
embody harder politics. In this case, the respondents might feel that Turkey’s international 
reputation could be at risk when the Turkish prime Minister reneges from the threat to impose
economic sanctions on a country invading a neighboring country. Perhaps the respondents 
interpret this shortcoming of economically opposing the invader as an embarrassment to their 
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international reputation. Alternatively, like in the Military Intervention scenario, respondents 
might also be wary of the dangers that come along with intervening in a foreign conflict. As 
such, respondents closely consider the assurance of their national and economic security. The 
salient concerns for the national security of Turkey could be related to protecting Turkey’s 
current status as an emerging economical power. Respondents, for that matter, might find the 
threat of imposing foreign economic sanctions to be a risky endeavor for Turkey’s national 
security.
And lastly, as for the Foreign Aid scenario (see Table 6), the pattern of rationales ranked 
as the most important changes when juxtaposed with the results from all other scenarios. In this 
scenario, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the promise 
of maintaining foreign aid and support, under any circumstance, to country Z. For this particular 
case of soft power foreign policy crisis, national security was yet again the most frequent ranked 
rationale as the most important at 34%. This was followed by the moral responsibility of Turkey, 
which was ranked as the most important at 25%. With lower percentages, Turkey’s international 
reputation was considered the most important 18% of the time, while Turkey’s healthy relation 
with its neighbors was ranked the most important only 12% of the time. And next to last, other—
specified or not specified reasons—was ranked the most important rationale only 8% of the time. 
The last rationale that again barely received attention as the most important is Turkey’s role as a 
regional leader. This rationale was ranked the most important just 4% of the time, making it the 
least popular rationale for the most important category across all scenarios (see Table 6). For this 
scenario it seems that respondents are more concerned about Turkey’s moral responsibilities 
more than their country’s international reputation and relations with neighbors. More 
specifically, the respondents might believe that extending foreign aid to a country embroiled in 
an intractable internal conflict is the moral responsibility for the Republic of Turkey. 
Consequently, the respondents might find it to be the Turkish Prime Minister’s moral 
responsibility to take a risk and uphold his promise to continue helping the country in need. On 
another note, the high salience for the national security indicates that respondents could feel 
uneasy about the idea of extending foreign aid to a country with escalating internal problems. 
More precisely, respondents might feel that such actions could endanger their national security at 
home and abroad.
In general, the findings across all scenarios were, for the most part, the same. The national 
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security, international reputation, and relationship with neighbors of Turkey resulted to be the 
most salient in all scenarios, while the moral responsibility of Turkey resulted to be salient in 
only one scenario. Not surprisingly, these rationales coincide with the issues that voters pay
attention to in Turkey’s foreign policy relations (see Kalacıoğlu 2009). On the other hand, 
Turkey’s role as a regional leader resulted to be the least salient across all scenarios. 
Interestingly, we see across all scenarios a mismatch between what rationales the respondents in 
my sample prioritize and the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) discourse highlighting 
Turkey’s role as a regional leader (see Hatipoğlu, Aslan, and Luetgert 2014). More specifically,
the results in all scenarios almost omit the idea of Turkey’s role as a regional leader. As such, 
these results differ from what the AKP manifests in their foreign policy discourse. All in all, 
these findings help better understand the motives that respondents use while deciding to agree or 
disagree with the way prime ministers handle foreign policy crises.
TABLE 6.  Most Important rationales for agreeing or disagreeing: All Scenarios
Most Important Rationales 
(frequencies)
Military 
Intervention 
Scenario
Economic 
Sanctions 
Scenario
Border 
Blockade 
Scenario
Foreign 
Aid 
Scenario
Turkey’s National Security 
or National Economic 
Security
1.
40/100
1.
29/100
1.
37/100
1.
34/100
Turkey’s International 
reputation
3.
14/100
2.
29/100
2.
34/100
3.
18/100
Turkey’s healthy relations 
with neighboring countries 
Turkey’s
2.
22/100
3.
17/100
3.
12/100
4.
12/100
Moral Responsibility 4.
13/100
4.
8/100
4.
8/100
2.
25/100
Other reason 5.
7/100
5.
7/100
5.
6/100
5.
8/100
Turkey’s role as a regional 
leader
6.
6/100
6.
6/100
6.
2/100
6.
4/100
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6.3. The “Unimportant” Rationales in all Scenarios
In order to gain a greater perspective on the frequency of the lowest ranked rationales, the three 
lowest ranking categories are collapsed into one category. More specifically; the categories 
somewhat important, least important, and not important; are all combined to express an 
unimportant category for agreeing or disagreeing with the Prime Minister’s foreign policy 
decision.
The order, in which the reasons were considered as unimportant by participants, subtly 
varies among all four scenarios (see Table 7). A similar pattern can be observed at first glance 
rendering little to be said in respect to the variation of rationales held as unimportant. 
Nonetheless, when looking closely at the juxtaposed results from all the scenarios, some 
observable slight variations are worth pointing out. In general, a trend that can be expected from 
the results is an inverse from the results of those rationales that were ranked as the most 
important. And sure enough, the results do encompass something along the anticipated trend. The 
results are explained in more detail for each scenario.
Results for the Border Blockade scenario illustrate significant frequencies for the option 
of other reason, which was an option that allowed participants to specify other rationales not 
listed (see Table 7). In total, the option for other reason—specified or not specified--was ranked 
unimportant 89% of the time for the Border Blockade scenario. Not surprisingly, this is the same 
case for all other scenarios. For example it was ranked unimportant 88% of the time for both the 
Military Intervention scenario and the Economic Sanctions scenario, and at 90% of the time for 
the Foreign Aid scenario. The option, other reason—specified or not, was added to the list of 
common reasons as an option for participants to express any other rationale that they might have 
held as more important than the given rationales. It could be plausible that the majority of 
participants ranked this option unimportant among all other options for obvious reasons. The 
respondents could have found it cumbersome to conceive other rationales that relate to political 
theory, or even encounter difficulties in finding any other relevant rationale that would explicate 
why they approved or disapproved of their leader’s decision. On the other hand, it is also true 
that several participants did in fact specify rationales for approving or disapproving of their 
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leader’s final decision. To what extent most of these specified rationales differed or coincided 
with each other, remains unclear. Particular content analysis of all specified reasons would be 
required. However, for the purposes of this study, such analysis won’t be necessary since at first 
glance the majority of specified rationales are either irrelevant or uninformed. 
Following this, the rationale of Turkey’s role as a regional leader was for the most part 
conceived as an unimportant rationale. Previously defined as one of the least ranked rationales 
for the most important category, this same option is now one of the most ranked reasons for the 
unimportant category. Overall, Turkey’s role as a regional leader was ranked unimportant for the 
Blockade scenario at 75%, and at 72% for both the Military Intervention scenario and the 
Economic Sanctions scenario. Trailing not very far behind, it was considered unimportant 67% 
of the time for the Foreign Aid scenario. In sum, Turkey’s role as regional leader can be 
considered as perhaps the most unpopular rationale for approving or disapproving with the prime 
minister’s foreign policy decisions. As previously mentioned, my findings suggest a discrepancy 
between what the incumbent government highlights as a foreign policy achievement, and what 
my respondents find salient in this policy area.
Subsequently, Turkey’s moral responsibility as a rationale for approving or disapproving 
of the leader’s decision was also considerable held as an unimportant rationale. While not very 
popular as an important rationale among the respondents, this option was a popular option for the 
unimportant category. In three scenarios; the Economic Sanctions scenario, the Blockade 
scenario, and the Military Intervention scenario; Turkey’s moral responsibility ranked as an 
overall 3rd unimportant rationale. More specifically, this rationale was ranked unimportant at 
63% for the Economic Sanctions scenario, while it was ranked unimportant at 57% for the 
Border Blockade scenario, and at 48% for the Military Intervention scenario. Only in the Foreign 
Aid scenario did Turkey’s moral responsibility result as the overall fourth unimportant rationale 
among all other unimportant rationale, at 42%. Another option that received close attention as an 
unimportant rationale is Turkey’s relation with its neighboring countries. This rationale was 
ranked unimportant at 48% for the Foreign Aid scenario, making it the third overall unimportant 
rationale for this scenario. Moreover, Turkey’s relation with its neighbors resulted as the fourth
overall unimportant ranked rationale for the Blockade scenario, the Military Intervention 
scenario, and the Economic Sanction scenario at 45%, 38%, and 36%, respectively.
Not surprisingly, the last two rationales left to account for are national security and 
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Turkey’s international reputation. Both of these rationales were very popular options for the most 
important category. And as expected, these rationales are also the least popular options for the 
unimportant category. Both, Turkey’s national security and Turkey’s international reputation 
differed in the order in which they were rank as unimportant rationales across all four scenarios. 
On the one hand, national security was ranked as an unimportant rationale for the Foreign Aid 
scenario at 38%, while it was ranked unimportant at 34% in the Economic Sanctions scenario, 
32% for the Military Intervention scenario, and at 27% for the Blockade scenario. On the other 
hand, international reputation was ranked unimportant in the Foreign Aid scenario by 34%,
which was closely followed by the Military Intervention scenario at 33%. Furthermore, this 
rationale was ranked unimportant with low percentages in both the Economic Sanctions scenario 
and the Border Blockade scenario, at 30% and 25%, respectively.
TABLE 7.  Least salient rationales for agreeing or disagreeing; all scenarios
Unimportant Rationales 
(frequencies)
Military 
Intervention 
Scenario
Economic 
Sanctions 
Scenario
Border 
Blockade 
Scenario
Foreign 
Aid 
Scenario
Other reason(s) 1.
88/100
1.
88/100
1.
89/100
1.
90/100
Turkey’s role as a 
regional leader
2.
72/100
2.
72/100
2.
75/100
2.
67/100
Turkey’s Moral 
Responsibility
3.
48/100
3.
63/100
3.
57/100
4.
42/100
Turkey’s Healthy 
Relations 
with  Neighboring 
Countries
4.
38/100
4.
36/100
4.
45/100
3.
48/100
Turkey’s National 
Security or National 
Economic Security
6.
32/100
5.
34/100
5.
27/100
5.
38/100
Turkey’s International 
reputation
5.
33/100
6.
30/100
6.
25/100
6.
34/100
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7.  NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AS DRIVERS OF 
DOMESTIC AUDIENCE COSTS
In the previous chapter the evidence thus confirms that for the majority of respondents, 
maintaining Turkish national security and the international reputation of Turkey, in each 
scenario, were more often considered as the most important rationales for approving or 
disapproving of the prime ministers’ decision. Do these findings hold across all scenarios when 
respondents disapprove, in other words are these rationales drivers for audience costs? Table 8
displays national security as a driver for audience costs in each scenario. And Table 9 displays 
international reputation as a driver for audience costs in each scenario. The most interesting 
outcome from Table 8 and Table 9 is that, in every scenario the respondents determine national 
security and international reputation to be important reasons for either partially or absolutely 
disagreeing with the Turkish Prime Minister’s decision to back down. 
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TABLE 8.   National Security as a driver for Audience Costs
Foreign Policy Scenarios National Security
Important (%) Not Important (%)
Hard Power Military Intervention 53 47
Economic Sanctions 67 32
Soft Power Border Blockade 79 21
Foreign Aid 58 42
Turkish national security was estimated to be a driver for audience costs in all scenarios. 
Respondents who either partially of absolutely disagree with the way the Turkish Prime Minister
handled a foreign policy crisis at hand, considered national security to be an important rationale 
at least 53% of the time in the Military Intervention scenario and as high as 79% of the time in 
the Border Blockade scenario. As for the international reputation of Turkey, it was also estimated 
to be a driver for audience costs across all scenarios. Respondents who either partially or 
absolutely disagreed with the way the Turkish Prime Minister handled the situation at hand, 
considered international reputation to be an important rationale at least 65% of the time in the 
Foreign Aid scenario and as high as 77% of the time in the Border Blockade scenario. Whether 
the foreign policy at stake is hard power or soft power, domestic audiences, it seems, disapprove 
of political leaders who renege, with national security and the international reputation in mind as 
salient rationales for disapproving. Although audience costs driven by both rationales were 
always evident in both tables, they varied with each scenario across Table 8 and Table 9. For 
example, in contrast to when respondents find national security as an important rationale for 
disagreeing, the motivation for audience costs was larger by approximately 15 percentage points 
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in the War Intervention scenario when respondents found that the international reputation of 
Turkey was an important rationale for disagreeing. Similarly, the motivation for audience costs 
was larger by approximately 7 percentage points in the Foreign Aid scenario when respondents 
found that the international reputation of Turkey was an important rationale for disagreeing. 
These differences make sense. Audience costs depend not only on how the public views 
empty commitments, but also on what the international community thinks when the Turkish 
Prime Minister reneges. Also it is widely recognized that citizens are more prone to demand 
coercive action only when their security and livelihood are at risk. This could explain why the 
international reputation of Turkey is a more salient driver over national security for audience 
costs in both the Military Intervention and Foreign Aid scenarios. As a result, national security is 
slightly seen as a more salient driver for audience costs than international reputation in both the 
Economic Sanctions scenario and the Border Blockade scenario by approximately 1 and 2 
percentage points respectively. Although these differences are much smaller than those from the 
other scenarios, it is discernible that national security was rendered an important rationale for 
leaders who backed down from a foreign policy concerning economic issues.     
These findings, though preliminary, suggest that national security and international 
reputation are important drivers for audience costs in both soft power and hard power foreign 
policy crises. The price of committing and backing down, for example, may be driven more by a 
concern for the international reputation of Turkey than national security in some scenarios of soft 
and hard power. On the other hand, national security might be more salient for respondents as a 
driver for disapproving of prime ministers who commit and back down. Finally, although a 
thorough analysis of the effects of national security and international reputation would require 
experiments in many countries, this analysis from a small random sample of Turkish citizens 
may be important results for further research in Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.
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TABLE 9.   International Reputation as a driver for Audience Costs
Foreign Policy Scenarios International Reputation
Important (%) Not Important (%)
Hard Power
Military Intervention 68 32
Economic Sanctions 66 34
Soft Power
Border Blockade 77 23
Foreign Aid 65 35
Given that national security and international reputation are salient drivers for audience 
costs, an alternative question remains: Could these two rationales also drive respondents to agree 
with the prime minister’s decision to back down?  Table 10 and Table 11 both illustrate that, 
indeed across all scenarios, Turkey’s national security and international reputation are both 
important rationales for respondents who chose to approve of the way the Turkish prime Minister
handled the foreign policy crisis at hand. Particularly, national security as a driver for approval 
was most prominent among the hard power scenarios. As seen on Table 10, the results could be 
due to the respondents’ perception of engaging in hard power foreign policy tools as an 
endangerment to their national security. The results for the international reputation of Turkey as a 
driver for approval, particularly, for the Economic Sanctions scenario and the Foreign Aid
scenario, are contradictory when juxtaposed with the results for audience costs.
Interpreting these contrasting results could be fruitful in understanding why respondents 
see a reneging leader’s decision as a justifiable case. However, for the sake of my research 
question, the focus in this research will remain confined towards understanding how these 
rationales help explain the role of audience costs across different tools of foreign policy.   
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TABLE 10.   National Security as a driver for Approval
Foreign Policy Scenarios National Security
Important (%) Not Important (%)
Hard Power Military Intervention 78 22
Economic Sanctions 74 26
Soft  Power Border Blockade 68 32
Foreign Aid 68 32
  
TABLE 11.   International Reputation as a driver for Approval
Foreign Policy Scenarios International Reputation
Important (%) Not Important (%)
Hard Power
Military Intervention 63 37
Economic Sanctions 74 26
Soft  Power
Border Blockade 68 32
Foreign Aid 74 26
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8.  WHY DO CITIZENS DISAPPROVE?
Why do Turkish citizens disapprove more of leaders who issue empty commitments in some 
scenarios while not so much in others? And what else drives audience costs for leaders across 
scenarios? After respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of their leader’s 
decision, they were asked to write in an explanation as to why they approved or disapproved. 
Respondents were specifically asked: “In this section, I would like to know why you approve or 
disapprove of the Prime Minister’s decision. Please explain your choice of answer in the space 
below, listing whatever factors affected or influenced your decision.” Respondents were able to 
write their answers directly into a text box, which made it easier for me to analyze each 
respondent’s personal rationale for their decision. In doing so, I was able to trace the process that 
led to audience costs in foreign policy for my respondents.
In looking closely across all open-ended responses for all four scenarios, almost all 
written responses fell into similar categories—with the exception of a few which misunderstood 
the follow-up question or provided an unclassifiable answer. 
The vast majority of responses were concerned with the inconsistency of the prime 
minister’s actions. Many viewed inconsistency problematic and thought that the prime minister
should have kept his or her promise no matter what circumstances were at stake. As one citizen 
explained, “being afraid is never a solution. Promises must be kept at all costs.” Others felt that 
“the prime minister stepped back when he or she could not reach his or her goal, and because 
“promises came without action, no countries would take the prime minister seriously.” A second 
group of respondents were more concerned about the international reputation of the Turkish 
Republic when the prime minister said one thing but did another. Some argued that such actions 
would mar Turkey’s standing in the international arena (“in international relations, issuing empty 
54
threats is the easiest way to lose international representation”). Others contended that the Turkish 
government should secure its national security for the sake of its international reputation and 
harmony with neighboring countries (“every country has good relationships with their neighbors 
but with securing its national security”). A few respondents disliked the Turkish government’s 
inconsistent actions for reasons that concerned the moral responsibility of Turkey with its 
neighbors. These few respondents viewed keeping foreign commitments with neighboring 
countries in need of help as a moral action; as one respondent simply put it: “helping neighboring 
countries is a moral action.”
These open-ended responses give preliminary support to the rationales that Turkish 
participants considered to be very important in their view of the way how the Turkish prime
ministers handled the situations at stake. The evidence in this article is consistent with Fearon’s 
(1994) logic of domestic audience costs mediating how much political leaders value their state’s 
international reputation. In this case, the majority of respondents value their country’s 
international reputation and national security. As a result respondents tend to disapprove of 
executive actions that put these at risk. Considering that citizens can hold leaders accountable, 
the role of domestic audience costs in hard and soft power foreign policies could encourage 
political leaders to take the international reputation of the state more seriously, and hence avoid 
making empty commitments.        
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9.  CONCLUSION
This thesis has offered a direct analysis of why audience costs exist. The research, based on a
questionnaire, shows that domestic audience costs exist across different foreign policy crises and 
vary with respect to hard and soft power foreign policies. The negative ratings to executive 
empty commitments are evident across all scenarios presented in the questionnaires, especially 
for the hard power foreign policy Economic Sanctions scenario. In addition, preliminary 
evidence suggests that domestic audience costs arise from concerns about the national security 
and international reputation of the country and its leaders.
These findings illustrate how questionnaires conducted to a small random sample of the 
Turkish population can address the question regarding the role of audience costs in hard and soft 
power foreign policies. Moreover, these findings also have substantive implications that could be 
important for further research. In particular, they provide a new outlook into understanding the 
role of domestic audience costs in international relations. Previous research has found that 
domestic audiences enhance the credibility of international commitments by holding leaders 
accountable who renege on their publicly issued commitment. I further delve into this by 
examining how audience costs vary across hard and soft power foreign policy crises. Despite the 
salient differences between hard and soft power foreign policies, the respondents regarded 
bluffing as an illogical strategy across all scenarios. 
In particular, audience costs resulted in higher frequencies for a hard power foreign 
policy scenario involving economic sanctions, and for a soft power foreign policy scenario 
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involving the blockade of national borders. Lastly, my results show that the majority of Turkish 
respondents were driven to punish reneging leaders in all foreign policy scenarios because of 
concerns for the international reputation and national security of the Turkish Republic. 
Additionally, the analysis also pointed towards respondents expressing some concern for
Turkey’s moral responsibility to help neighboring countries and towards Turkey’s foreign 
relationship with its neighbors. Interestingly, the rationale of Turkey’s role as a regional leader
received very little attention from the vast majority of respondents.
Although this thesis contributes to an understanding of how Turkish voters might come to 
terms in dealing with leaders who say one thing but do another in foreign affairs, my sample of 
100 Turkish voters is not representative of the Turkish population. Moreover, my research was
limited to questionnaires, whereas studies by Tomz (2007; 2009) were experiments embedded in 
public opinion surveys and interviews. For my research to improve, some measures would have 
to take place. To begin with, a representative sample of the Turkish population would be 
essential in testing the role of audience costs in different foreign policy tools. Second, more 
elaborate statistical analyses would be fundamental for examining more accurately how the role 
of audience costs varies with respect to hard and soft power foreign policies. And lastly, my 
research might benefit more from insightful information about the preferences and beliefs of 
random Turkish voters from across the nation. 
Finally, this thesis--while limited to a relatively small local sample size--may still provide 
some implications for policy-makers. In general, domestic audience costs may play an important 
role across different foreign policy crises. And in light of this, it should be noted that political 
leaders should not disregard domestic audiences when considering whether to wield hard power 
or even soft power foreign policy tools. Moreover, Turkish policymakers should pay close 
attention to the domestic concern for the national security and international reputation of Turkey. 
The respondents in my research demonstrated that they worry about leaders who break 
commitments. Largely, because most respondents noted that such actions by reneging leaders 
would undermine Turkey’s international credibility, and put Turkey’s national security at risk. 
All in all, respondents found it justifiable to disapprove when the Turkish Prime Minister adopted 
reputation-damaging strategies. As a result, Turkish citizens may seek to elect leaders who 
appear to be more competent at valuing and preserving the national security and international 
reputation of Turkish Republic. Further research would be fruitful in examining how political 
57
leaders deal with strong domestic pressures during a foreign policy crisis. Another interesting 
question would be to address when, and under what circumstances, do leaders begin to safeguard 
their country’s international reputation and national security. Domestic audience costs may, 
therefore, help explain how many leaders have adopted concerns for the integrity of national 
security and international reputation.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE
Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Anketi
Merhaba, bu çalışmada yer almayı kabul ettiğiniz için teşekkür ederim.
Size bu çalışmada, ülke liderlerinin dış siyasette karşılaştıkları durumlarda yaptıkları tercihlere 
dair bir dizi senaryo sunmaktayım. Liderlerin geçmişte sıkça karşılaştığı 4 farklı dış siyaset 
durumunu okuyacaksınız. Bu durumlara farklı liderler farklı şekilde tepki verebilirler.
Size senaryolar teker teker açıklanacak ve her bir senaryonun sonunda ülke liderinin aldığı 
kararı ne ölçüde onayladığınız sorulacak. Lütfen soruları verilen sıraya göre cevaplayınız. 
(Senaryolarda bahsi geçen liderlerin şu an görevde olan liderlerle bir ilişkisi yoktur, 
senaryolardaki liderler hayal ürünüdür).
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İlk önce buradan başlayın…….
Senaryo #1
● Türkiye’nin en önemli doğalgaz sağlayıcılarından olan P Ülkesi Türkiye’ye yaptığı gaz 
dağıtımını hiçbir açıklama yapmadan büyük ölçüde azaltır. 
● Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı doğal gaz dağıtımı eski seviyesinde devam etmezse, 
Türk Hava Yolları’nın P Ülkesi’ne uçmasını yasaklayacağını ve ek olarak P Ülkesi’yle 
ticaret sınırlarını kapatacağını resmen açıklar. 
● Başbakan Türk Hava Yolları’yla görüşmelere başlar ve P Ülkesi’yle olan ticareti 
gerektiğinde durdurmak için gerekli ticari ve finansal kararnameleri hazırlar. 
● Buna rağmen P Ülkesi Türkiye’ye gaz dağıtımını azaltmaya devam eder. 
● Bu gelişmeler üzerine Türkiye Başbakanı, Türk Hava Yolları’nın P Ülkesi’ne uçmasını 
yasaklama iddiasından vazgeçer ve ülke sınırlarını ticarete açık tutar. 
LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ
A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın Türkiye sınırlarını ticarete kapamaması ve Türk Hava Yolları'nın P 
ülkesine uçmaya devam etmesini ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?
1. Kesinlikle
onaylıyorum
2. Kısmen 
onaylıyorum
3. Ne onaylıyor ne 
onaylamıyorum 
4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum 
5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum
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Senaryo #1
B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı’nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı 
öğrenmek istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şıkkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi 
faktörlerin etkili olduğunu yazınız.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Senaryo #1
C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası 
nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1­6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı 
rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).
_________ Türkiye’nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_________ Türkiye’nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_________ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ulusal ekonomisini korumak
_________ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): ____________________
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Şimdi bir sonraki senaryoya geçelim….
Senaryo #2
● A Ülkesi, Türkiye’nin komşusu olan B Ülkesi’nin yönetimini ele geçirmek üzere 
ordusunu gönderir. 
● Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Başbakanı saldırı devam ettiği takdirde Türk Ordusunun, A 
Ülkesi’nin B Ülkesi’ni işgal etmesini önleyeceğini resmen açıklar. 
● Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti daha sonra B Ülkesi’ne Türk askeri birliklerini 
gönderip onları savaşa hazırlar. 
● Buna rağmen A Ülkesi B Ülkesi’ni işgal etmeyi sürdürür. 
● Bunun üzerine Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, B Ülkesi’ndeki Türk askeri 
birliklerini savaşa sokmayıp geri çekmeye karar verir. 
LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ
A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın B ülkesinden Türk askerlerini çekmesi kararını ne ölçüde 
onaylıyorsunuz?
1. Kesinlikle 
onaylıyorum 
2. Kısmen 
onaylıyorum
3. Ne onaylıyor ne 
onaylamıyorum 
4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum 
5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum
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Senaryo #2
B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı’nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek 
istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şıkkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin 
etkili olduğunu yazınız.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Senaryo #2
C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası 
nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1­6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı 
rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).
_________ Türkiye’nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_________ Türkiye’nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_________ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_________ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): ____________________
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Şimdi bu senaryoya geçelim…….
Senaryo #3
● X Ülkesi, Türkiye’nin komşularından biri olan Y Ülkesi’nin yönetimini ele geçirmek için 
ordularını göndermiştir. 
● Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, saldırı devam ettiği takdirde Türkiye’nin X Ülkesi’ne 
ekonomik yaptırımlar uygulayacağını resmen açıklar. 
● Başbakan X Ülkesi’ni eleştirerek diğer komşu ülkeleri X Ülkesi’ne ekonomik yaptırımlar 
uygulama konusunda kendi tarafına çekmeye çalışır. 
● Buna rağmen X Ülkesi Y Ülkesi’ni işgal etmeye devam eder. 
● Bu duruma rağmen Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, X Ülkesi’ne herhangi bir 
ekonomik yaptırım tehditi uygulamaz. 
LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ
A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın X ülkesine yaptığı ekonomik yaptırım tehditini geri çekme kararını 
ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?
1. Kesinlikle 
onaylıyorum 
2. Kısmen 
onaylıyorum
3. Ne onaylıyor ne 
onaylamıyorum 
4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum 
5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum
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Senaryo #3
B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı’nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek 
istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şıkkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin 
etkili olduğunu yazınız.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Senaryo #3
C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası 
nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1­6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı 
rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).
_________ Türkiye’nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_________ Türkiye’nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_________ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_________ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): ____________________
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Ve son olarak bu senaryoya bakalım…...
Senaryo #4
● Z Ülkesi’nin vatandaşları bir seneden uzun bir süredir Türkiye’den dış yardım almaktadır. 
● Son zamanlarda Z Ülkesi’nin vatandaşları ülkedeki muhaliflerden (isyancılardan) 
gittikçe artan güvenlik tehditleriyle karşı karşıyadır. 
● Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Başbakanı güvenlik tehditleri devam ederse, 
Türkiye’nin, barışı sürdürmek için Z Ülkesi’ne yardım akışını ve diğer bütün 
desteği devam ettireceğini resmen açıkladı. 
● Başbakan, Z Ülkesi’ne Türkiye’den daha fazla uzman gönderip barışı sürdürmek için 
gerekli olan maddi destek akışının düzenli bir şekilde yapılmasını sağladı. 
● Buna rağmen muhalifler Z Ülkesi’nin vatandaşlarını tacize ve şiddetli saldırılarına devam 
etti. 
● Bu durumda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, barışı sürdürmekten vazgeçip Türkiye’den 
giden tüm profesyonelleri ve diğer bütün yardımları Z Ülkesi’nden çekmeye karar verdi. 
LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ
A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın yukarıda anlatılan durumda vermiş olduğu yardımı geri çekme kararını
ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?
1. Kesinlikle 
onaylıyorum 
2. Kısmen 
onaylıyorum
3. Ne onaylıyor ne 
onaylamıyorum 
4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum 
5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum
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Senaryo #4
B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı’nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek 
istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şıkkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin 
etkili olduğunu yazınız.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
Senaryo #4
C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası 
nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1­6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı 
rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).
_________ Türkiye’nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_________ Türkiye’nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_________ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_________ Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_________ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): ____________________
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1
Ve lütfen son olarak hızlıca tüm senaryoları düşünün…..
Tüm senaryoları göz önünde bulundurarak sizin için en önemli olanı seçin. Seçtiğiniz bu senaryo 
sizin için neden önemli, ve diğer senaryolara kıyasla hangi açıdan önemli?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Çok teşekkür ederim. Lütfen son olarak aşağıdaki birkaç soruyu cevaplayınız.
Kişisel Karakteristik Özellikler
1. Yaşınız? (birini seçiniz): 
A. 18-24 
B. 25–34 
C. 35–44 
D. 45–54 
E. 55–64 
F. 65 veya üstü 
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2. Cinsiyetiniz? (birini seçiniz): 
A. Kadın 
B. Erkek 
3. Tamamladığınız eğitim düzeyiniz nedir? (birini seçiniz): 
A. İlkokul mezunu 
B. Lise terk 
C. Lise diploması 
D. Üniversite terk 
E. Üniversite diploması 
F. Yüksek lisans derecesi 
G. Doktora derecesi 
4. Medeni durumunuz? (birini seçiniz): 
A. Bekar, hiç evlenmemiş 
B. Evli veya hayat arkadaşlığı 
C. Dul 
D. Boşanmış 
E. Ayrı 
5. Siyasi görüşünüz. Aşağıdaki şekil sol ve sağ siyasi görüşleri temsil etmektedir. 1 tam sol siyasi
görüşte olmayı, 9 tam sağ siyasi görüşte olmayı, 5 ise ikisinin ortasında bir siyasi görüşte olmayı
göstermektedir. Kendinizi bu şemada nerede konumlandırırsınız? (birini seçiniz):
[ 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 ] 
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6. Siyasi katılımda kendinizi ne derece aktif buluyorsunuz? (birini seçiniz) 
A. Çok aktif 
B. Biraz aktif 
C. Pek aktif değil 
D. Pasif 
1
7. Şu anki iş statünüzü nasıl tanımlarsınız? (birini seçiniz): 
A. Tam zamanlı iş sahibi 
B. Yarı zamanlı iş sahibi 
C. İşsiz / iş arıyor 
D. Öğrenci 
E. Yuva kurucu (Ev Hanımı/Ev Beyi ) 
F. Emekli 
8. Yıllık aile geliriniz ne kadar? (birini seçiniz): 
A. 10,000 TL’den az 
B. 10,000–24,999 TL 
C. 25,000–49,999 TL 
D. 50,000–74,999 TL 
E. 75,000 TL veya üstü 
9. Geçen seçimlerde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? ___________________ 
10. Yarın bir seçim olsa kime oy verirdiniz? ______________________ 
Anket bitmiştir. Zaman ayırdığınız için çok teşekkür ederim!
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